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Many studies have shown a relationship between antidumping duty and col-
lusion. These studies, however, only focus on collusion in output (downstream)
market, i.e. collusion between import competing firms and exporters, or among
import competing firms. This dissertation explores how the antidumping duty on
downstream goods can affect collusive behavior in an upstream market of exporters
whom are subjected to the duty.
Bertrand duopoly model with infinite periods is developed to examine the
effect of the antidumping duty on collusive behavior. Under a set of discount rate,
whether is influenced by a tariff or the antidumping duty, the exporters will fully
cooperate. The unaffected rate might be due to the linearity in input supply and
output demand assumptions. Although the discount rate is not sufficiently high
enough to support the full cooperation, the collusive behavior is still feasible through
self-enforcing agreement. With future period self-enforcing agreement, under the
antidumping duty, the full cooperation in the initial period that is feasible under
a set of the discount rate is called “the restricted full cooperation”. The set under
free trade that supports the full cooperation is smaller than the one supporting the
restricted full cooperation. Therefore, the antidumping duty on downstream goods
is pro-collusive in the upstream market.
The theoretical result is tested by using Thai shrimp industry data during
1996-2009; the industry has been subjected to the U.S. antidumping duty since 2005.
2SLS is employed to estimate a system of Thai fresh shrimp supply, the U.S. demand
for Thai frozen shrimp, and the mark up equations. Using comparative static in
supply approach, with an interaction between fresh shrimp price and rainfall as a
supply rotator, the empirical results confirm that the antidumping duty increases
the degree of collusion among the exporters in Thai shrimp market at 1 % significant
level.
Antidumping Effects in the Presence of Collusion in an Upstream
Market
The case of U.S. frozen shrimp imports from Thailand
by
Ravissa Suchato
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment




Assistant Professor Carol McAusland, Chair/Advisor
Associate Professor John K. Horowitz, Co-Chair
Associate Professor Douglas Lipton
Associate Professor Howard Leathers





I would never been able to finish my dissertation without guidance of my
committee members, help from friends, and support from my family.
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Carol McAus-
land, for her excellent guidance, caring, encouraging words, patience, and providing
me with an excellent atmosphere for doing research. I am pleased to thank my
co-chair, Dr. John Horowitz, for his patience, and valuable guidance and comments
on my empirical analysis. I am also pleased to thank my committee members, Dr.
Douglas Lipton, Dr. Howard Leathers, and Dr. Nuno Limão, for their thoughtful
criticism and time throughout the process of writing this dissertation. I would like
to express my deep respect to Dr. Bruce Gardner who initially inspired me on this
topic.
I would like to thank members of Charoen Pokphand Foods PCL., Charoonpan
Janesasta, Thiranan Panachuenvongsakul, Oraphan Talawa, Tabthip Seangkheaw,
and Yuttana Thongphur for providing some data and infomation used in this dis-
sertation. I would also like to thank my wonderful classmates, Lucija Muehlenbachs
for her encouragement and her help on proofreading my earlier drafts, and Ling Yee
Khor for his support during these five years. I am thankful to Pacharasut Sujarit-
tanonta for his valuable help on my model and programing mathematica. I would
like to thank Sirin Nitinawarat for his guidance on writing in Latex. Another thanks
go to Chatchawan Panraksa who was helping me with my math problems
I am grateful to my Thai friends here who shared their memories and expe-
ii
riences. Special thanks go to my roommates, Kanitta Sirisoonthorn and Nisachol
Hanpanish for their friendship, entertainment, and support.
Finally, my greatest hearted thanks and appreciation go to my parents Rujatit
and Sasivimol, brother Sasit, sister Rujamas, uncle Suchat, and Parinya Thanyavas
for their constant moral support, patience and love. I know that without them this
would have never been possible.
iii
Table of Contents
List of Tables vi
List of Figures vii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Statement of problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Objective and hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Organization of the study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Thai shrimp industry and literature review 5
2.1 Thai shrimp industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1 Detail of Thai shrimp production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.2 Overview of Thai shrimp industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.3 Price history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1.4 Accusations of collusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 Literature review on antidumping effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.1 Antidumping effect on collusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.2 Antidumping effect on market power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3 The model of oligopsonistic collusion in upstream market 29
3.1 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 Collusion under free trade and an exogenous tariff . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.1 The Bertrand competitive outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.2 The fully cooperative or unconstrained cooperative outcome . 35
3.2.2.1 Full cooperation under free trade . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2.2.2 Full cooperation under an exogenous tariff . . . . . . 37
3.2.3 The constrained cooperative outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.3.1 Constrained cooperation under free trade . . . . . . 40
3.2.3.2 Constrained cooperation under an exogenous tariff . 41
3.3 Collusion with the antidumping duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3.1 The Bertrand competitive outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.2 The fully cooperative or unconstrained cooperative outcome . 47
3.3.3 The constrained cooperative outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4 Empirical model and estimation results 54
4.1 The empirical industry organization approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2 Comparative static in supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.3 The empirical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.4 Data collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.5 Estimation procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.6 Empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.6.1 Fresh shrimp supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.6.2 Frozen shrimp demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
iv
4.6.3 Mark up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5 Summary and conclusion 85
A Cooperation under Antidumping case 88
A.1 The constrained cooperative price under Antidumping case . . . . . . 88
A.2 The critical discount rate which supports restricted full cooperation
under the antidumping duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
A.3 Combinations (a, d, k) used in numerical analysis for βad . . . . . . . 112
B Shrimp production 119
B.1 The shrimp farm area in Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
B.2 Supply rotation with rainfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121




2.1 Thai shrimp export 1999-2007:ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Thai shrimp export 1999-2007:Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Characteristics of shrimp culture at three levels of intensity . . . . . . 10
2.4 Shrimp culter systems of major producers in 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5 Thai shrimp production by specie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6 Vannamei Production Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.7 Monodon Production Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.8 Number of shrimp processors classified by plant size . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.9 Average shrimp prices at Mahachai Auction Market by species and
sizes (unite: baht) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.10 Preliminary and final dumping margins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.1 Estimation results for Fresh shrimp supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2 Estimation results for U.S. demand for Thai frozen shrimp . . . . . . 80
4.3 Estimation results for the mark up equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
B.1 Month of shrimp culture by size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B.2 Average month of shrimp culture by year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
vi
List of Figures
2.1 Share of Thai shrimp export . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Shrimp farm area in Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 The four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) of Thai shrimp exporters . . 23
3.1 Processors, shrimp farmers and fish agents’ locations . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 Comparison of discount rate which supports the restricted full-cooperation
cooperation under free trade and Antidumping . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.1 Shift in supply curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58




1.1 Statement of problem
Thailand has been the world’s leading exporter of shrimp for several years
and held 25% of the world market share in 2001 (FAO 2001). Shrimp is considered
significant to the Thai economy since shrimp makes up over a quarter of its’ total
food exports. Although there are a lot of shrimp exporters in Thailand that export
shrimp all over the world, about 50% of Thai shrimp export belongs to only three
agribusiness companies (Aqua culture Asia Facific, 2005). In 2005, the U.S. im-
posed an antidumping duty on Thai frozen shrimp, the U.S. largest shrimp supply,
along with other five shrimp exporting countries1. Dumping is legally defined as
when imports are sold at less than “normal value” and when these imports cause
injury to domestic industries in the importing country. In addition to the duty, the
exporters are required to post a continuous bond (C-bond) which is calculated from
the exporter’s total export value from the previous year and the current antidump-
ing duty. After the imposition of the antidumping duty, a lot of small and meduim
exporters (processors) were shut down (shrimpnews, 2006) which lead to a more
concentrated Thai shrimp export sector. The four-firm concentration ratio (CR4)
of Thai shrimp exporters increases from 38.88 percent in 2004 to 42.42 and 65.23
1Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, and Vietnam
1
percent in 2005 and 2007 respectively. This raises the question of whether Thai
shrimp exporters (processors) collude among each other and have market power at
the domestic fresh shrimp procurement level and whether the imposition of the an-
tidumping duty influences the degree of collusion among the Thai shrimp exporters
(processors) in Thai shrimp Industry.
Thai shrimp and international trade have been the focus of many studies
(Krasachat(1987), Krasachat and Manerat (1991), Samapat (1994), Ling (1996),
Malisorn (1996), Iamlaor(1998), Raubrhoo (2002),Potathanapong(2002)); however,
the structure of the Thai shrimp industry and the existence of the exporters’ (pro-
cessors’) collusion has never been analyzed. With collusion and market power, when
any trade policy is imposed, the exporters (processors) can pass through the effect
of the policy to their input supply. By ignoring the existence of collusion and market
power, the analysis of trade policy effect on Thai shrimp export would be biased.
The link between an antidumping and collusion has been a focus in the an-
tidumping literature (Staiger and wolak (1992), Prusa (1992), Veugelers and Van-
denbussche (1999), Hartigan (2000), Zanardi (2004), Davies and Liebman (2006)).
This literature has only considered the possibility that an antidumping duty induces
international collusion in a downstream market2; specifically, the literature consid-
ers collusion between domestic firms in a country that imposes the antidumping
duty and foreign competitors from a country subjected to the antidumping duty, or
the antidumping duty enhances the market power of the domestic firms due to the
2A downstream market refers to an output market while an upstream market refers to an input
market.
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constraint placed upon the foreign competitors. Since the presence of foreign compe-
tition exerts market discipline upon the domestic firms, introducing the antidumping
duty reduces this disciplinary effect. Under the presence of the antidumping law,
the foreign competitors will commit to reduce their export in exchange for a com-
mitment by the domestic firms in the importing country not to file the antidumping
duty. With import reduction, as a result, the antidumping duty allows the domestic
firms to exploit market power in the downstream market.
This dissertation instead examines the impact of antidumping duties on col-
lusion in upstream markets. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to
examine such a link. A policy maker should be aware of a result of an antidumping
duty on collusion in an upstream market. Ignoring this effect might result to mis-
calculation in the duty level. Moreover, this is also the first study to investigate the
industry structure and the existence of collusion within the Thai shrimp industry.
1.2 Objective and hypothesis
The objective of this research is to develop a theoretical model which can
explain how the antidumping duty influences collusive behavior in the upstream
market. The model hypothesizes that, with perfect information, the antidumping
duty supports more collusion among the exporters in the upstream market. Later
on, we develop an empirical model to examine collusive behavior in Thai shrimp
market and test our hypothesis whether the antidumping duty facilitates collusive
behavior in the upstream market.
3
1.3 Organization of the study
Chapter 2 provides Thai shrimp industry background and a literature review
on the impact of the antidumping duty on collusion and market power. In chapter
3, the theoretical model is developed. Chapter 4 provides an empirical application
of the model to Thai shrimp industry and discusses the empirical results. Summary
and conclusion are in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Thai shrimp industry and literature review
2.1 Thai shrimp industry
World shrimp production rapidly increased from 0.41 to 1.7 million metric tons
between 1950 and 1980 and from 1.6 million metric tons in 1981 to 6.1 million metric
tons in 2006 (FAO, 2007). The share of shrimp production from developing coun-
tries such as Thailand, China, Vietnam, Ecuador, Indonesia, and India increased
consistently while the shrimp production of the main consumers- - the US, EU, and
Japan- - steadily declined. The total consumption of these main consumers is around
60% of world production and 80% of the world export. Thailand is the world’s ma-
jor shrimp exporter. In 2001, 80% of Thai shrimp production was exported to the
world market, that being 255,717 tons worth $2.23 billion dollars (table 2.1 and
2.2). In 2005, as illustrated in table 2.1 and 2.2, and figure 2.1, shrimp exports
are comprised of 57% chilled and frozen products and 43% prepared and preserved
products. Thailand’s primary shrimp markets are USA (receiving 50% of total Thai
shrimp exports) and Japan, while its secondary markets include Singapore, Canada,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.1: Share of Thai shrimp export
Source: table 2.1
2.1.1 Detail of Thai shrimp production
Official recording of Thai shrimp production started in early 1970’s (Shrimp
News International 2007)1 . Black tiger prawn (Penaeus Monodon) was first in-
troduced in 1974 by the Department of Fisheries; however, this shrimp did not
become popular until 1983 when a Taiwanese company came to survey a possi-
bility of establishing a shrimp food factory and an aquaculture breeding training
center (Manarungsan et al.2005). Early shrimp farming in Thailand was mostly by
an extensive system which modifies mangrove forests into large trapping ponds for
shrimp. This is because the mangrove forest was a concentrating ground for small
aquatic fauna such as juvenile fish which is a great source of shrimp feed, so that
shrimp farmers did not have to provide any shrimp feed during the culturing period.
1http://www.shrimpnews.com/About.html
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Shrimp ponds were comparatively large compared to other systems, ranging from 5
to 10 ha (Suchato 2003). However, this extensive system has the smallest yield, and
shrimp size is very small.
In 1980, the semi-intensive system was introduced to Thai shrimp farming
through the Aquaculture Development Project, a U.S.$33.1 million soft-loan2 from
the Asian Development Bank (Menasveta 1995). The semi-intensive system ponds
could be developed through intensification of existing extensive ponds. There are
some modifications needed to be done such as clearing and leveling the pond bot-
tom, digging a canal in the pond bottom, converting from tidal water exchange to
pumped water exchange, controlling stocking density, using more fertilizers, using
fish toxicants to control fish intruders, and providing shrimp feed etc. Therefore
this system has higher yield than the extensive one.
Shrimp farms were occupying some 35,200 ha in 1983 but increased to 40,000
ha in 1985 . However, the black tiger prawn was not internationally accepted until
1987 when its demand dramatically increased. The high demand for shrimp and
the prospect of high profit have been the main driving forces for farmers to engage
in shrimp farming. As a consequence of the growing demand in Japan and other
markets, Thai shrimp production increased to 10,544 tons from a land area of 51,200
ha (Manarungsan et al. 2005).
Around 1995, Thai shrimp farming adopted an advanced technology for the
intensive system which is very similar to Taiwanese shrimp farming methods. With
this new method, the shrimp production rate increased about 5-10 times of that from





















































































































































































































































































the semi-intensive system as illustrated in table 2.3. Since then the intensive shrimp
farms are also liberated from harvesting wild-caught juveniles as a large number
of shrimp fry are produced from hatcheries. It should be noted that the mangrove
forests are not required in this new technology. This is because some requirements of
the intensive method make the mangrove areas entirely incompatible. For example,
shrimp ponds are required to be completely dried to facilitate sanitation and removal
of large organic accumulation at the bottom of the ponds after a shrimp crop.
Moreover, alkaline water conditions are required for optimal shrimp culture, but
the soil in the mangrove areas is high in organic content such as humus, which is
acidic in nature and inappropriate for shrimp growth. With this intensive farming
technology, however, a lot of shrimp farmers adopting semi-intensive and intensive
systems had over used chemicals to prevent diseases in their ponds. Moreover, those
with the extensive system also use chemicals as well. Therefore, antibiotics are often
found in shrimp residue.
In 2001, the EU, one of the largest shrimp consumers in the world, declared
a zero tolerance policy for bacteria residual called chloramphenicol that restricted
exports of shrimp from Vietnam and China and imposed 100 percent testing on
Thai shrimp.
Although the EU was the third largest market for exports of Thai shrimp
at that time3, the EU’s new zero tolerance policy posed only mild threat to Thai
shrimp industry, since, in 2002, Thailand widely adopted chemical and antibiotic-
3In 1996, Thai shrimp exporters were facing a problem of their graduation from the EU’s
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) which increased import tariff on Thai shrimp to the EU.
11
Table 2.4: Shrimp culter systems of major producers in 2002
Country Production Area Culture system (%) Yield
(Ton) (Hectare) Extensive Semi-intensive Intensive (ton/Ha./year)
Thailand 250,000 80,000 5 10 85 3.13
Ecuador 100,000 90,000 50 45 5 1.11
Indonesia 100,000 300,000 80 10 10 0.33
India 70,000 80,000 65 30 5 0.87
Vietnam 50,000 225,000 90 10 0 0.22
Bangladesh 35,000 110,000 60 40 0 0.32
China 35,000 150,000 10 80 10 0.23
Philippines 30,000 50,000 35 50 15 0.6
source: Menasveta 2005
free technology called Probiotic farming. Probiotic farming is a bio-technology to
grow shrimp by using only necessary and environmentally friendly microorganisms
instead of the chemicals or antibiotics. As a result, Thailand claims its shrimp
products as the safest and most environmentally friendly in the world compared to
its competitors such as China, Vietnam, Indonesia; see table 2.4. Moreover, this
new technology has benefited Thai shrimp industry a lot as the US and Japan, later
on, have become increasingly concerned about food safety.
Table 2.5: Thai shrimp production by specie
production (ton)
year shrimp specie
black tiger white total
2000 307,261 0 307,261
2001 276,044 0 276,044
2002 202,439 60,000 262,439
2003* 194,909 132,365 327,274
2004* 106,884 251,697 358,581
2005* 20,055 374,487 394,542
2006* 3,977 503,207 507,184
Source: FAO (2007) and fisheries economics division, Department of Fishery,
Thailand (2007) (*)
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In addition, in 2002, the new shrimp species called white shrimp or Penaeus
vannamei was first introduced in Thailand but not commercially accepted until
2003. Thai shrimp farmers rapidly switched to the white shrimp. As shown in
table 2.5, the production of Thai white shrimp was only 60,000 tons while Thailand
produced 202,439 tons of black tiger prawns in 2002. The production of white shrimp
jumped to 503,207 tons (or about 99.22%) in 2006; in contrast, there were only
3,977 tons (0.78%) of black tiger prawn produced. Thai white shrimp production
increased sharply because white shrimp are easy to culture, have a high growth
rate, and are more robust to unsuitable environments than are black tiger prawns.
Moreover, white shrimp require less protein in their feed, further reduces white
shrimp’s production cost relative to black tiger prawns.
In the middle of 2006, Charoen Pokphand Foods (CFP) group conducted a
study of the costs and benefits of both shrimp species. As it is illustrated in table 2.6
and table 2.7, the total cost of production for the white shrimp of a medium size
(60 counts per kilogram) in Thailand is about 93 bahts while it costs about 135
bahts to produce the black tiger prawn with the same size. In addition, the white
shrimp have much higher yield and survival rates which are 1,500 kilogram per rai4
and 75% respectively while the black tiger prawn yields only 520 kilogram per rai
and has 65% survival rate. The average selling prices at farm gate in mid 2006 were
about 115 bahts per kilogram for white shrimp and 145 bahts per kilogram for black
tiger prawn. In short, profit per kilogram of white shrimp is 22 bahts per kilograms















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































while the black tiger prawn profit is 10 bahts per kilogram.
2.1.2 Overview of Thai shrimp industry
There are about 35,000 shrimp farms spread across approximately 80,000
hectares in Thailand. As illustrated in figure 2.2, shrimp farms and hatcheries are
scattered along the coastal areas of Thailand. Southern provinces such as Nakorn
Sri Thammarat, Surat Thani account for the majority (55 percent of shrimp farms)
while those in the East such as Chanthaburi and central regions such as Samut
Sakhon, Samut Songkram comprise the minority in terms of number (35 and 10
percent of shrimp farms repectively). More than 80% of shrimp farms are small or
about 1-4 ponds per farm (less than 1.5 hectares per farm), 18% have between 1.5 to
2.5 hectares per farm, and only 2% are very few large farms with more than 40 ponds
(larger that 10 hectares per farm)5. There are about 300 fish agents while there are
only 124 processors in Thailand. As illustrated in table 2.8, there are only 13 large
processors in the shrimp processed industry. Moreover, most of these large proces-
sors belong to only three agribusiness companies –Charoen Pokphand Food group
(CPF), Thai Union Frozen Food group(TUF), and Rubicon group–which account
for 50% of Thai processed shrimp production (aquaculture Asia Pacific 2005).6
Thai shrimp market channels are as follows:
1. Fresh shrimp for the domestic market. Domestic shrimp consumption
in Thailand comprises only 10 - 15 % of Thai shrimp production (The office of
5National Food Institute (Thailand), Department of Fisheries statistics, 2007
6Most Thai processors not only sell their products to exporters but also export their products
to the world market. There are 198 Thai shrimp exporters including the processors
16
Figure 2.2: Shrimp farm area in Thailand
Source: office of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives,
Thailand (2007)
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Table 2.8: Number of shrimp processors classified by plant size
type small medium large
Canned shrimp 0 4 1
Frozen shrimp 56 46 11
other 23 25 4
Source:The office of Industry Economics 2004.
Note1: plant size is categorized by capital investment. Large size represents a plant with
more than 200 million baht. Medium size is a plant with 50-200 million baht, and small
size is a plant with less than 50 million baht capital investment
Note2: some processors are double counted due to their product varieties.
Industry Economics, Thailand, 2007)7. Most of the shrimp consumed domestically
are small shrimps which are not desired in the world market. In the domestic market,
shrimp is sold from shrimp farmers through fish agents in shrimp wholesale markets
to wholesalers and retailers.
2. Processed shrimp for international market. Thai shrimp sold inter-
nationally account as 85 - 90% of the total production. Once shrimp is grown to a
desirable size, a shrimp farmer will contract fish agents in a shrimp wholesale mar-
ket8 or shrimp processors to offer a price for shrimp. Processed shrimp for export
can be distributed from shrimp farms to processors via
-wholesale, fish agents
-direct sale. This channel usually involves farms located near a processor.
However, the processors normally purchase fresh shrimp through fish agents because
fish agents have higher volume and size variety.
Price setting in Thai shrimp market. Each processor announces his own
daily shrimp price by species and size. Once fish agents purchase fresh shrimp
7www.oie.go.th
8The main shrimp market in Thailand is Mahachi Auction Market in Samutsongkram province
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from shrimp farmers, they will sell shrimp to processors with the best offer (price).
However, it is said that the three agribusiness companies are price-setting leaders in
the market as their purchase volume account for about 50% in the shrimp market.
Table 2.9: Average shrimp prices at Mahachai Auction Market by species and sizes
(unite: baht)
species size (count/kg) year
2003 2004 2005 2006
Black Tiger 30 295 272 248 221
40 240 231 213 181
50 197 186 178 153
60 155 158 161 137
70 133 132 145 129
80 120 119 129 122
90 113 114 124 116
100 107 113 120 112
White 40 215 201 180 180
50 172 149 151 144
60 146 125 132 123
70 127 111 119 113
80 116 103 108 103
90 108 96 100 96
100 101 89 92 90
source: CPF, 2007
2.1.3 Price history
Although Thailand has been increasingly exporting frozen shrimp to the U.S.9,
Thai shrimp farmers have been facing a decrease in domestic shrimp prices as shown
in table 2.9. There is a concern that the processors and/or the exporters are behind
the price decrease10. The processors and exporters might have been colluding and
9The export still increases even though it was imposed the antidumping duty.
10Department of fishery Thailand (2007), National Institute of Coastal Aquaculture (nicaon-
line.com, 2007), Siammarine (www.siammarine.com, 2007), Journal of Marine Industry (2006)
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pushing the domestic fresh shrimp price down in order to maintain their compet-
itiveness (price of shrimp products) in the U.S shrimp market especially after the
imposition of the Antidumping duty.
After the imposition of the antidumping duty, Thai frozen shrimp prices in the
U.S. seem to have dropped by the most compared to its competitors and even below
those that were not imposed a duty. A price for medium Thai frozen shrimp (56-66
counts per kilogram) price in the U.S. market was 12.6 dollars in June 2003, but
it dropped to 6.28 dollars or about 50.16% dropped in June 200511. Likewise, the
U.S. price of large Thai frozen shrimp (less than 33 counts per kilogram) decreased
from 13.12 to 6.49 dollars or about 50.53% in June 2003 and 2005 respectively. In
contrast, the average price of medium frozen shrimp in the U.S market was declined
20.56% during this period, unlike, the average U.S. price for large frozen shrimp
increased about 6.16%. Furthermore, the U.S. price of shrimp from large exporting
large shrimp such as Ecuador (with lower antidumping duty), Vietnam,and Mex-
ico(without the duty) were higher in 2005 than in 2003 (USITC, 2007). On the other
hand, the processors argue that the decrease in price is caused by world’s demand
and supply rather than their actions (colluding) (Shrimp News,2006).
Unfortunately, there is no solid evidence or study demonstrating the existence
of Thai processors’ collusion in setting shrimp domestic price12 and any shock such
as the U.S antidumping duty can affect the degree of collusion.
11The imposition of the antidumping duty started in February 2005
12Jintatham (1995) descriptively concludes in his study that Thai domestic shrimp market is
perfect competitive
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2.1.4 Accusations of collusion
In 2004, Thai shrimp industry was subjected to antidumping petition from
the U.S., along with other five shrimp exporting countries13. The U.S. International
Trade Commission (USITC) affirmatively determined that the U.S. shrimp industry
has been materially injured by these countries subjected to the duty. Also, The US
Department of Commerce announced its preliminary determinations in the dumping
case against these six targeted exporting countries, finding that producers/exporters
sold frozen shrimp in the US market at less than normal value14 with different
dumping margin ranges for each country. As it is shown in table 4.3, China had the
highest national preliminary average margin–112.81% following by Vietnam, Brazil,
India, Thailand and Ecuador respectively.
Finally, on February 2005, the Department of Commerce issued antidumping
duties for all six countries, and amended the nation’s average final dumping mar-
gins, which would be the nation’s average final antidumping duty being imposed
on frozen shrimp imports from these six countries. The antidumping duties were
imposed after it was determined that warm-water shrimp imported was sold at a
less normal value, dumped, causing material injury to domestic producers (Sharp
and Zantow, 2005). The final dumping margins were slightly different from the
preliminary ones except for Vietnam. The final dumping margin for Vietnam was
only 25.76% while the preliminary one was 93.1%. Moreover, the US Customs and
13Brazil, China, Ecuador, India,and Vietnam
14Normal value could be either a lower price than in its own local market, in the third market,
or if there is no foreign price to observe whether they are selling at less than the average cost of














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.3: The four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) of Thai shrimp exporters
Source: Thai Customs Department (2008)
Border Protection, or CBP, implemented the continuous bond measures (C-bond)
requiring that banks guarantee deposits from the exporters to guarantee antidump-
ing margin payments. The bank guarantees are to be calculated on the exporters’
total export value for the previous year. In addition, the guarantee deposits have to
be issued by international banks accepted by the US. Therefore, it would be harder
for these six shrimp exporting countries to compete in the US shrimp market and
may cause the market shares of these countries to decrease as suggested in Debaere
(2005) who finds that a regular tariff sufficiently reduced Thai shrimp export to EU
market by 7%.
As a result of the U.S. antidumping duty on frozen shrimp import, as shown
in figure 2.3, the four-firm concentration ratio ( CR4 )
15 , which is used to assist in
15It is calculated by sum of the percent market share of the four largest firms in an indutry
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determining the market structure of the industry, of Thai shrimp exporters increase
from 38.88 % in 2003 to 42.42 % and 65.23 % in 2005 and 2007 respectively.
2.2 Literature review on antidumping effect
2.2.1 Antidumping effect on collusion
In recent decades, antidumping has become the most widespread obstruction to
trade16; moreover, economists have discovered that this trade protection influences
competitive behavior. While the antidumping duty gives short-run advantage to a
domestic industry by raising import cost, it sometimes also benefits foreign rivals as
well. This is because the threat of the antidumping duty decreases competition and
causes output and/or price to shift toward monopoly levels. Some studies (Staiger
and wolak (1992), Prusa (1992), Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999), Hartigan
(2000), Zanardi (2004), Davies and Liebman (2006)) recogniz the link between the
antidumping and international collusion. All of these studies focus on collusion in
the downstream market between a domestic industry in an importing country and
exporters. These studies show that an antidumping duty increases the likelihood
of international collusion between firms in a country that imposes the antidumping
duty and exporting firms from a country that is subjected to the duty. The exporting
firms will commit to increase their export price or reduce their exports in exchange
for a commitment by the firms in the importing country not to file the antidumping
16For example, July 1980 - July 1981 the World Trade Organization reports that a total 173 of
Antidumping petitions were filed worldwide, and the number of the antidumping petition increased
to 312 for the same period in 2000-2001 (reported in Zanardi (2004))
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charge.
Staiger and Wolak (1992) present a model in which a competitive domestic
industry responds to the import from the foreign exporter by filing the antidumping
petition. The authors provides conditions under which the foreign exporter agrees to
decrease its export in exchange for the domestic industry not to file the antidumping
petition.
Prusa (1992) finds evidence of collusive behavior from the fact that withdrawn
antidumping case leads to an almost equal reduction of imports in those cases in
which the duties are implemented. The act of the antidumping initiation causes
the foreign exporters to eliminate the dumping margin or face the possibility of
a large antidumping duty. Initiating the antidumping petition acts as a credible
threat to foreign exporters that are dumping. Some exporters eliminate the dumping
margin before the outcome of the petition. The domestic firms who filed the petition
withdraw the case since the dumping margin has been eliminated. The market power
of the domestic firms can thus be affected by the petition decision. The author
develops a model of oligopsonistic price competition in which the foreign exporter
and the domestic firms can always find a collusive behavior that increases the profit
of all firms involved. The author confirms his theoretical finding by examining the
value of trade both before and after petitions filed as the U.S. antidumping cases in
1980-1981. He looks at ratios of the value of trade before and after the petition to
detect a change in response to the antidumping duty investigation. He concludes
that the antidumping petition serves as a method to achieve a cooperative level of
profit for domestic and foreign firms.
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Adopting the Prusa (1992) model to include costs of coordination, Zanardi
(2004) finds that antidumping petitions may be used to threaten and induce foreign
exporters into a collusive arrangement depending on the cost of coordination and the
relative bargaining power between the domestic and foreign exporting firms. The
authors also finds that the antidumping law is used to gain collusion in exchange for
withdrawing the petitions. A withdrawn petition can be a credible threat in that
the domestic industry can punish any foreign exporters misbehavior by reinstating
the petition.
Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999) investigate the effect of the antidumping
law on collusion between domestic firms as well as between the foreign exporters
and domestic firms. The authors find that, depending on the degree of product
heterogeneity and cost asymmetry between the foreign exporting firms and domestic
firms, introducing an antidumping law can result in all firms forming a full cartel,
cooperation only between domestic firms, or pure competition.
Davies and Liebman (2006) present a quantity competition model in which
the foreign firm is a multinational with a subsidiary in the domestic country. The
authors show that even when the antidumping duties are imposed, the antidump-
ing legislation can still be used to support mutually-beneficial collusive outcomes.
Thereby, the multinational firm may choose to submit to a tariff even under collusive
behavior since removing duties can tighten the incentive-competibility constraint of
the multinational firm, eliminating the sustainability of some collusive equilibria.
In contrast to other studies suggesting that the antidumping law can facilitate
collusive behavior, Hartigan (2000) finds that the antidumping law can be procom-
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petitive. The domestic and foreign exporting firms collude in the absence of the
antidumping law because the law makes renegotiation of collusion more costly than
imposition of punishment for defection. Sufficiently costly renegotiation ensures
that punishments for defection are credible, so that they serve as a deterrent to
deviation from collusive behavior. With a weak injury standard, the antidumping
law permits the renegotiation of collusion at a low cost. Thus, it can undermine
collusion.
Outside of the work on antidumping laws, Lommerud and Sorgard (2001)
study the impact of trade barriers on collusive behavior. The authors present a
model in which two price-competing firms collude by not exporting to one another’s
market. They find that a reduction in trade barriers17 increases the gain from
deviation as well as the punishment of reverting to the Nash equilibrium; they find
the set of discount rates that sustain collusive behavior declines when the gain from
deviation dominates.
2.2.2 Antidumping effect on market power
Less attention has been given to the fact that the antidumping duty can act
as a coordinating device that facilitates an indutry in a country to exploit market
power when it is found guilty in a dumping case.
Nieberding (1999) constructs an empirical test of market power, based on the
Lemer index, to investigate the effects of U.S. antidumping law on domestic firms’
17The authors do not specific a type of trade barrier rather they use a per-unit trade cost between
countries.
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market power. Using industry level data, the results show that U.S. firms’ market
power increased after petition acceptance and decreased after petition rejection.
In an extension to Nieberding (1999), Haan (2000) uses firm-level data to
examine the impact of the antidumping law on the domestic firms’ market power
in the Canadian steel industry. The author finds that market power significantly
increases for all firms after an affirmative antidumping injury decision. Moreover,
market power is higher for firms that initiated the antidumping petitions.
Konning and Vandenbussche (2005) use data of 4000 EU firms that were
involved in the antidumping case during 1992-2000 to estimate domestic firms’
markups before and after the filing of a case. The authors define the domestic
firms’ markup as price over marginal cost. They find that the antidumping duty
has positive effects on the domestic firms’ markups, except in cases where import
diversion after protection is strong.
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Chapter 3
The model of oligopsonistic collusion in upstream market
In this chapter, we develop the theoretical model which shows how an an-
tidumping duty can result in a change in the collusion equilibrium in the processors’
(exporters’) upstream market. In this model, processors (exporters) are assumed to
be oligopsonists in their upstream market1 but not oligopolists in their downstream
market. We identify the minimum discount rate under which the processors fully
cooperate and act as a monopsonist in the upstream market. We also explore joint
profit maximizing behavior if the firms when the discount rate is not sufficiently high
to support the monopsony outcome; we call this the “the constrained cooperation”
outcome
This chapter is constructed as follows. In section 3.1, we give a formal descrip-
tion of the model. Collusion equilibria in the case of free trade and an exogenous
tariff are provided in section 3.2. Section 3.3 analyses collusion equilibria under an
antidumping duty.
3.1 The model
Consider the following Bertrand duopoly model with infinite periods. There
are two identical risk neutral processors (exporters) that use a homogenous input -
1For the purpose of this study, the upstream market is the Thai market for fresh unprocessed
shrimp, while the downstream market is the U.S. market for processed frozen shrimp.
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Figure 3.1: Processors, shrimp farmers and fish agents’ locations
fresh shrimp- to produce a homogenous product -frozen shrimp- which they export
to an international market. Antitrust law prevents the processors from forming
enforceable price agreements, so any collusion must be done tacitly through self-
enforcing agreements. For simplicity, we assume “perfect monitoring” (Friedman
(1970) , Kosenok (2005))2, i.e., each processor can observe the other processor’s
action; this is referred to as
For simplicity, we assume each processor is located at the two endpoints of the
unit interval [0, 1], as per figure 3.1. Processors offer input prices (for fresh shrimp)
wi and wj to fish agents/shrimp farmers who are uniformly distributed on the [0, 1]
interval. Each fish agent/shrimp farmer produces one unit of fresh shrimp. The fish
agents/shrimp farmers have constant marginal costs of producing fresh shrimp, c,
and face a transportation cost v for reaching a processor; thus shrimp farmers/fish
agents will choose a processor as long as the combined offered price of fresh shrimp,
marginal cost and transportation cost is greater than the competitive processor. If
both processors offer the same price, the fish farmers and fish agents will sell fresh
shrimp to the processor closest to them. A fish agent/shrimp farmer who is located
2Other classes of monitoring are “public monitoring” where the processors know only their own
action and a publicly observed signal related to the joint actions of all processors, and “private
monitoring” where each processor can observe its own private signal of the actions of the other
processors(Green and Porter (1984), Hanazono (2003), Kosenok (2005), and Zheng (2006). How-
ever, as for the main focus of this paper, the perfect monitoring case yields more tractable result
than others
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at s ∈ [0, 1] incurs a transportation cost vs if he sell his shrimp to processor i located
at point 0, and a transportation cost equal v(1−s) if he sells his shrimp to processor
j located at point 1. This fish agent/shrimp farmer is indifferent between selling
shrimp to processor i and j if
wi − c− vs = wj − c− v(1− s). (3.1)
Thus, fresh shrimp supply to the processor i is 3
si =
v + wi − wj
2v
. (3.2)
To make the result more compact, we assume that the transportation cost
v = 1
2





+ wi − wj. (3.3)
Moreover, it is assumed that both processor i and j also do contract farming
with local fish agents/shrimp farmers at the endpoints as their additional fresh
shrimp supply. For tractability,with zero transportation cost, we assume that the
processors’ contract fresh shrimp supplies are Li = wi and Lj = wj for processor i
and j respectively. Thus, the total fresh shrimp supply for processor i is
xi = si + Li =
1
2
+ 2wi − wj. (3.4)
3The fresh shrimp supply for processor j analogs to the processor i’s; the subscript i is replaced
by j, and subscript j is replaced by i
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In addition, we assume that the frozen shrimp production technology is char-
acterized by a fixed proportion technology of output (frozen shrimp) and a single
material input (fresh shrimp), so that 1 kilogram of fresh shrimp is transformed to
k kilograms of frozen shrimp. Thus, processor i’s cost of producing frozen shrimp is
Ci =
[wi + d]xi(wi, wj)
k
(3.5)
where d is an exogenous cost of nonmaterial inputs used to produce frozen shrimp.
As for processor j’s production cost, the subscript i will be replaced by j. The
output (frozen shrimp) quantity is
yi = kxi(wi, wj). (3.6)
Downstream demand for frozen shrimp is derived from a representative con-
sumer’s utility defined for each period t. It is denoted as U(yi, yj, a2, z) with a2
is quantity of processors/exporters from other countries and z is a proxy for all
other commodities, chosen as the numeraire. We assume the utility function to be
strictly quasi-concave and have positive marginal utilities for each product. More
specifically, similar to Pauwels et al. (2001), we assume the utility function to be
U(yi, yj, z) = a1[yi + yj + a2]−
1
2
[yi + yj + a2]
2 + z (3.7)
where a1 is positive. This utility function is quasi-linear and implies that there
are no income effects in the demand for yi and yj. From equation 3.7, the inverse
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demand functions for processor i’s sales is given by
pi = a− yi − yj. (3.8)
Where a = a1 + a2. Despite the clear endogeneity of the downstream price, we
assume processor i and j only collude on the upstream price; they do not collude
in the downstream market. This assumption is consistent with the structure of the
global shrimp market: although there are only a small number of firms purchasing
fresh Thai shrimp for export, there are a large number of firms supplying the global
market for frozen shrimp. Moreover, because the supply of frozen shrimp from
countries other than Thailand is noisy and imperfectly observable (at least by Thai
processors), we conjecture it would be unproductive for Thai processors to condition
their collusive behavior in the upstream market on downstream prices. Accordingly,
we assume without further apology that each processor does not take into account
his competitor’s downstream price when colluding in the upstream market.
Moreover, allowing for the possibility that both processors are subjected to a
tariff τ in the downstream market, processor i’s profit in period t is
πi(wi, wj, τ) = [k (pi − τ)− wi − d]xi(wi, wj). (3.9)
We are interested in the processor’ behavior when engaged in an infinitely
repeated game. Accordingly, we add time subscripts t to all price and market vari-
ables to indicate relevant periods; for example, processor i’s input price in period t
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is written as wit. Let β < 1 denote the universal intertemporal discount factor, and
let




measure processor i’s (normalized) discounted stream of profits.4
Next, we will analyze the equilibrium of the game under the free trade, an
exogenous tariff, an antidumping duty scenarios.
3.2 Collusion under free trade and an exogenous tariff
We start with the free trade and an exogenous tariff cases as our baseline
model. We examine symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria, in which the pro-
cessors pursue a grim trigger strategy: offer a low fresh shrimp price provided no
one has deviated before; offer the Bertrand input price otherwise.
3.2.1 The Bertrand competitive outcome
Consider now the static Nash equilibrium. In this case, each processor uni-
laterally makes its decisions and plays Bertrand competition. Processor i’s profit
maximizing problem in the stage game to chose wi so as to maximize is
πi(wi, wj, τ) ≡ [k (pi − τ)− wi − d]xi(wi, wj) (3.11)
4Multiplying the discounted profit stream by (1 − β) allows to use the same units to express
profits in the stage game and the repeated game.
34
taking wj and τ as given. Define
wi(wj, τ) ≡ arg max
wi
πi(wi, wj, τ) (3.12)
as i’s Nash Best response to wj given τ , and
πi(wj, τ) ≡ max
wi
πi(wi, wj, τ) (3.13)
as i’s maximized profit (again, subject to his competitor’s price wj and exogenous
tariff τ).
Denote the Bertrand price as the solution to wb(τ) = wi(w
b(τ), τ); define the
static Bertrand profit as πb(τ) = πi(w
b(τ), τ). Given our earlier assumptions on
supply and demand functions, the Bertrand price and static profit which wb(τ) =
4[k(a−k−τ)−d]−1
2(3+4k2)




3.2.2 The fully cooperative or unconstrained cooperative outcome
Under certain discount rates, both processors fully cooperate and act collec-
tively as a monopsonist in the upstream market. Denote the monopsony price and
static profit as








Thus, we can obtain the monopony price and profit which are wm(τ) = 2[k(a−k−τ)−d]−1
4(1+k2)




3.2.2.1 Full cooperation under free trade
Consider free trade case when τ = 0, the Bertrand price and static profit can
be written as wb(0) and πb(0). Likewise, the monopsony price and static profit can
be written as wm(0) and πm(0). We yield Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Under free trade, the monopsony input price can be sustained for




Proof of Proposition 1. To find the condition on the values of β required to support
monopsony input price, we need to check that any single period deviation from
cooperation does not offset the long run losses. The highest possible short run
profit from deviation is from the static game best response to the opponent’s play of
the monopsony price (wm). Denote the profit from deviation as πi(w
m(0), 0). The
optimal deviation is for processor i to set his input price at 2[(5+8k
2)(ak−d)−8k2(1−k2)]−3
16(1+k2)(1+2k2)
given processor j plays cooperatively, i.e. wj = w
m(0). The profit earned in the




which is higher than the
static profit from cooperation. In every subsequent period, the deviator is punished
and gets the Bertrand payoff πb(0). Thus, full cooperation is sustained when the
following inequality is satisfied:
πm(0) ≥ (1− β)πi(wm(0), 0) + βπb(0)⇐⇒ β ≥ β ≡
(3 + 4k2)2
17 + 16k2(3 + 2k2)
(3.16)
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With a sufficiently high discount rate, both processors always fully cooperate
and behave as a joint monopsonist in their input (upstream) market because the
future gain from cooperation is high or, in other words, the future punishment from
deviating is sufficiently severe.
3.2.2.2 Full cooperation under an exogenous tariff
Next we consider that case where τ > 0 for all provides.
Proposition 2. When a positive tariff is imposed on downstream goods in every
period, the critical discount rate which supports the monopsony input price is not
affected by the tariff.
Proof of Proposition 2. To demonstrate this proposition, we need to show that the
discount rate which supports the fully cooperative outcome under the tariff is the
same as the one under free trade. As above, πi(w
m(τ), τ) gives i’s static profit from
deviation given processor j is playing cooperatively (wj = w
m(τ)). The optimal
deviation is to set the input price at 2[(5+8k
2)(k(a−τ)−d)−8k2(1−k2)]−3
16(1+k2)(1+2k2)
, yields static profits
of πi(w




In every sequent period the deviator is punished and gets the noncoopera-
tive payoff πb(τ). Full cooperation is supported when the total payoff from full
cooperation is greater than the total payoff from deviation;
πm(τ) ≥ [1− β] πi(wm(τ), τ) + βπb(τ). (3.17)
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Because
πm(τ) = απm(0), (3.18)
πi(w
m(τ), τ) = απi(w
m(0), 0), (3.19)
and










In our simple model, the critical discount rate which supports full cooperation
is not influenced by an exogenous tariff. Accordingly, imposing a tariff on frozen
shrimp does not affect the condition (a set of the critical discount rates) which
supports full cooperation among the processors in the upstream market.
3.2.3 The constrained cooperative outcome
In the Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2, we define the optimal deviation which
yields higher static profit than does cooperation. The normalized short run gain
from deviating [1− β] [πi(wm(τ), τ)− πm(τ)] is an incentive for a processor to de-
fect and set a higher-than- monopsony price for fresh shrimp. Once a processor
defects from cooperation, both processors revert to their Bertrand (Nash) price5
in subsequent periods and earn Bertrand profits. Thus, the normalized value of





5This punishment is credible because Bertrand price is indeed optimal in the non-cooperative
game.
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Cooperation is characterized by maximizing of joint profit in the cooperative
stage, subject to the self-enforcement constraint which is neither processor has an
incentive to deviate from cooperation. Define wcc(τ, β) as the price which sustains
constrained cooperation when the tariff is τ for all periods and the discount rate is




subject to the self-enforcement constraint





For future reference, define
πcc(τ, β) = πi(w
cc(τ, β), wcc(τ, β), τ). (3.23)
The self-enforcement constrain equation 3.22 is satisfied if, for each processor,
the gain from deviating is no greater than the discounted punishment loss. If this
condition is not satisfied, then the processors will have an incentive to deviate. Note
that when the discount rate is high (β ≥ β), the self-enforcement constraints are
not binding because the processors highly value their future gains from cooperation.
Thus, any sufficiently high discount rate (β ≥ β) will support the fully cooperative
outcome as a self-enforcing agreement. However, when the discount rate is low,
the cooperation is not supported (Bagwell and Staiger (1990), Ederington (2001),
Nielsen (2006) ).
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We now focus on the case that self-enforcement constraint is binding (β < β).
3.2.3.1 Constrained cooperation under free trade
To earn better intuition, we start our analysis on the constrained cooperative
input price with the free trade case when τ = 0.
Lemma 1. Under free trade, with a self-enforcing agreement in upstream market
and β < β,
• The constrained cooperative input price is higher than the monopsony input
price.
• The constrained cooperative input price is decreasing in the discount rate.
• The cost of self-enforcement is decreasing in the discount rate.
Proof of Lemma 1. The constrained cooperative fresh shrimp (input) price is







4(1+k2)(8+8k2(3+2k2)+(9−β+8k2(3+2k2))λ(0,β)) . The shadow value of self-enforcing





. Hence, the constrained cooperative




= −4(1− 2d+ 2ak) (3 + 10k
2 + 8k4)(
β − (3 + 4k2)2
)2 ≤ 0. (3.24)
Hence, the constrained cooperative input price is decreasing in the discount rate.
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Finally, we need to show that the self-enforcement cost (λ(0, β)) is decreasing






2 + 1)(k + 1)
(β − (3 + 4k2)2)2
≤ 0. (3.25)
From Lemma 1, there are two components in the constrained cooperative input
(fresh shrimp) price. The first component,2[k(a−k)−d]−1
4(1+k2)
, is the same as the monopsony
price. The second component,
(1−β)(3+4k2)(1+2(−d+ak))λ(0,β)
4(1+k2),(8+8k2(3+2k2)+(9−β+8k2(3+2k2))λ(0,β)) , contains the
shadow value of self-enforcement6 resulting in a difference between the constrained
cooperative price and the monopsony price. Later, we refer to the inverse of the
second component as the ‘degree of cooperation’. The lower the value of the second
component, the closer the constrained cooperative price is to the monopsony price,
i.e., the degree of cooperation is high. Intuitively, the higher the discount rate, the
higher the degree of cooperation; this is because the processors highly value the
future gain from cooperation, and so are more willing to cooperate. The results also
hold when a tariff is imposed on downstream goods (τ > 0).
3.2.3.2 Constrained cooperation under an exogenous tariff
When a tariff is imposed, the constrained cooperative price becomes









(8−(−9+β)λ(0,β)+8k2(3+2k2)(1+λ(0,β)))2 ≥ 0. Thus, the




4(1+k2)(8+8k2(3+2k2)+(9−β+8k2(3+2k2))λ(τ,β)) . The shadow value of the self-




β(β−(3+4k2)2)A1 where A1 = β(1+2(ak−d))
2 +4k(3+
4k2)2τ(2(d− ak − kτ)− 1) and A2 = (β − 1)2β(3 + 4k2)4(2(k(a− τ)− d)) + 1)2.
Lemma 2. The shadow cost of self-enforcement is increasing in a tariff.
Proof of Lemma 2. To show that the shadow cost of self-enforcement is increasing
in a tariff, we need to show that the derivative of the shadow cost of self-enforcement


















+ 32(1 + 3k2 + 2k4)A3
)]
> 0. (3.26)
Where A3 = (3 + 4k
2)2(2(k(a− τ)− d)) + 1), and A4 = (β− 1)2β(3 + 4k2)4(2(k(a−
τ)− d) + 1) .
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is as follows. The tariff reduces the future
gain from cooperation making processors less willing to cooperate under the tariff.
Therefore, the cost associated with self-enforcement under the tariff is higher.
Proposition 3. When a tariff is imposed in every period, the constrained cooperative
input price is decreasing in the tariff on downstream goods.
Proof of Proposition 3. To show that the constrained cooperative price is decreasing
in the tariff, we need to show that the derivative of the constrained cooperative price
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A tariff has two opposing effects on the constrained cooperative input price.
Firstly, the tariff raises costs for the processors. The processors can pass through
their costs to their input suppliers by lowering input price. Secondly, the tariff
raises the cost of self-enforcement because it lower anticipated gain from constrained
cooperation. As per Lemma 2, the cost of self-enforcemnet increases as the tariff
increases. In this model, the second effect is dominated by the first one. As a result,
the constrained cooperative price in this setting decreases when the tariff increases.
3.3 Collusion with the antidumping duty
Consider that these two processors are potentially subjected to an antidumping
duty. Antidumping duties are imposed at the behest of domestic industries that
compete with imported goods, when the domestic producers believe they can make
the case that a foreign firm is selling goods in the home (i.e., import) market at less
than normal value7. The antidumping duty is an endogenous tariff which depends
upon the exporters’ behavior in the previous period. Similar to other antidumping
studies, we assume that the processors (exporters) will be filled the antidumping
7Normal value can be defined either a lower export price than a price sold in the exporters’
local market, in the third market, or if there is no foreign price to observe whether the exporters
are selling at less than its average cost plus some profit margin
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petition when a goods’ price is lower than some threshold P ≥ pi (Veugelers and
Vandenbussche (1997), Kolev and Prusa (1999), Hartigan(2000), Blonigen and Park
(2004), Schmitz and Seale(2004), Ishikawa (2004)). Like Blonigen and Park (2004)
and Ishikawa (2004), we assume the threshold P is very high such that the processors
(exporters) will always face an antidumping petition, and the dumping margin is
determined from the processors’(exporters’) behavior in the previous period8 .
The initial antidumping duty determination and the following administrative
review(s) are costly and time consuming (Blonigen and Park 2004), so that the
processors might face the same antidumping duty level for multiple periods. For
simplicity, we assume that the antidumping determination and the following admin-
istrative review(s) are very long, so that the duty level in any period t ≥ 2 only
depends on the processors’ behaviors in the first period (t = 1). Specifically, we
assume the antidumping duty is the difference between first period price of frozen
shrimp and first period average cost plus an exogenously given profit margin m.
8For the U.S. antidumping margin calculation, the US Department of Commerce subsequently
issued the antidumping questionnaire to selected exporters from the subjected countries. The
exporters were asked to provide information related to the affiliation of the companies and U.S
importers. Then, the U.S. Department of Commerce compared the export price or constructed
export price to the normal price which, in this case, is the cost of production. The export price is
calculated for the sales where the merchandise was sold to the first unaffiliated purchaser in the
U.S. prior to importation by the exporter or producer outside the U.S. The export price is based
on the packed price to unaffiliated purchaser in the U.S. The constructed export price is calculated
for the sales where the merchandise was sold (or agreed to be sold) in the U.S. before or after the
date of importation by an exporter. The DoC based the constructed export price on the packed
delivered prices to unafliated purchasers in the U.S. There are some billing adjustments to both
the export price and constructed export price. The cost of production is based on the sum of
the cost of materials and fabrication for the foreign like product, plus an amount for general and
administrative expenses, and interest expenses. (Federal Register Vol.69 No.149)
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Thus, the antidumping duty imposed in period t ≥ 2 is
τi(wi1, wj1) =

(wi1 + d+m)− pi1 when wi1 + d+m > pi1(wi1, wj1)
0 when wi1 + d+m ≤ pi1(wi1, wj1).
(3.28)
Given the same antidumping duty in each period t ≥ 2, the processors’ profits
in each period t ≥ 2 are identical:
πi(wi, wj, τi(wi1, wj1)) ≡ [k[pi(wi, wj)− τi(wi1, wj1)]− wi − d]xi(wi, wj) (3.29)
where τi = 0 in the first period. The processor’s static problem is to maximize his
profit subject to the constraint in which the antidumping duty cannot be negative.
To solve for the equilibrium, we need to solve backward from future periods to get
the future fresh shrimp price as a function of the first period fresh shrimp price.
3.3.1 The Bertrand competitive outcome
In every period t ≥ 2 when i plays the Bertrand price wbi (τi(wi1), τj(wj1))
and j plays the Bertrand price wbj(τi(wi1), τj(wj1)) which are Nash equilibria to
the static profit maximization game in which the firms face (potentially) difference
antidumping duties.
In the first stage, each processor takes into account the impact of his current
pricing behavior on the future antidumping duties facing himself and his competitor,
recognizing that at every future stage each processor will engage in Bertrand pricing.
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τi = (w + d+m)− pi(w,wj1) ≥ 0. (3.31)
Equation 3.31 indicates that the antidumping duty cannot be negative.
































and the Bertrand first period






. Given out earlier assumptions on input supply
and output demand functions, and the dumping margin calculation, the Bertand















.9 The shadow cost of the duty-




9where A5 = 45− 4d(−45 + 2k(7 + k(−91 + 2k(21 + k(−51 + 4k(10− 3k+ 6k2))))))− 4k(−7 +
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3.3.2 The fully cooperative or unconstrained cooperative outcome
With sufficiently high discount rate, both processors will fully cooperate and
act as a joint monopsonist in the upstream market. In every period t ≥ 2, both pro-
cessors play the monopsony price wm (τ(w1), τ(w1)) which is the optimal cooperative
outcome to the static joint profits maximization game.
In the first period, the processors take into account the effect of their pric-
ing behaviors on the future antidumping duties facing themselves, recognizing that
every future period both processors will engage in monopsony pricing . Therefore,













(w + d+m)− p(w,w) = 0. (3.33)
The future monopsony price is the solution to
wm (τ(wm1 (β, 0))) = w
m (τ(wm1 (β, 0)), τ(w
m
1 (β, 0))), and the monopsony first period
price is the solution to wm1 (β, 0) = w1(w
m
1 (β, 0), 0). Define the static monopsony
future profit as πm (τ(wm1 (β, 0))) = π
m (wm1 (β, 0), τ(w
m
1 (β, 0))) and the monopsony




1 (β, 0), 0). From assumptions on input supply
and output demand functions and the antidumping duty definition, the value of the
Bertrand future price as a function of the Bertrand first period price can be obtained
as wm (τ(wm1 (β, 0))) =
(k((4a−3k−2m)−k(1+k)wm(m,β)])−1−2d(1+k))
(4(1+k2))
. Also, the Bertrand
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Both Bertrand and monopsony input prices in the first period under the an-
tidumping duty are lower than the ones under free trade because the processors
also account for the cost of the antidumping duty in the future. The processors’
first-period prices will enter into the processor’s future profits as a cost of the an-
tidumping duty, so that the processors will lower their first-period price in order to
get a lower antidumping duty in the future.
3.3.3 The constrained cooperative outcome
We now consider the situation in which the discount rate is not sufficiently
high to support full cooperation. The cooperation is still feasible through the self-
enforcing agreement.
In every period t ≥ 2, the processors play the constrained cooperative input
price wcc (τ(w1), τ(w1)) which is the optimal outcome to the static join profit max-
imization problem subject to the self-enforcing constraint. Denote, the constrained
cooperative static profit as πcc(τ(w1), β) = πi (w
cc (τ(w1), τ(w1)) , w
cc (τ(w1), τ(w1)) , τ(w1))
In the first period, both processors takes into account the impact of their cur-
rent pricing behaviors on the future antidumping duties facing themselves, recog-
nizing that at every future period both processors will play constrained cooperative
pricing. Define wcc(β, 0) as the price which sustains constrained cooperation at the
11Where A9 = 2− 2d
(
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subject to the triggering antidumping duty
(w + d+m)− p(w,w) = 0 (3.35)
and the self-enforcing constraint
[1− β] [π1(w, 0)− π1(w,w, 0)] ≤ β
[





Define the constrained cooperative future price as the solution to wcc(τ(wcc(β, 0))) =
wcc(τ(wcc(β, 0)), τ(wcc(β, 0)), β).We can obtain the constrained cooperative future
price as a function of the constrained cooperative first period price, wcc(τ(wcc(β, 0))) =
4(1+2k2)(1+2(1+k)(d+kwcc(β,0))+k(−4a+3k+2m))+λ(wcc(m,β))A12
2(−8(1+3k2+2k4)+(β−(3+4k2)2)λ(wcc(m,β)))
.13 Where the cost of self en-





The first-period constrained cooperative input price under antidumping duty
is wcc(β, 0) =
2(1+k2)(2(k(a−k)+(1+k)µ)−d)−1)−βA17
8(1+k2)2+2β(2+(−1+k)k)(2+k+3k2) +R(λ


















+ 2k(−4a+ k + 2m)
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wcc(β, 0) (−1 + 2d(1 + k) + k(−4a+ k + 2m) + k(1 + k)wcc(m,β),
A15 = (−1 + β)2β
(
3 + 4k2
)4 (−1 + 2d(1 + k) + k(−4a+ k + 2m) + 2k(1 + k)wcc(β, 0)) 2(β(1 −
2d + 2ak)2 + k
(
3 + 4k2
)2 (−2a + 2d + k + 2m)(−2 + 2d(2 + k) + k(−6a + k + 2m))), and
A16 = β(1− 2d+ 2ak)2 + k
(
3 + 4k2
)2 (−2a+ 2d+ k + 2m)(−2 + 2d(2 + k) + k(−6a+ k + 2m))
15Where A17 = (3 + 4k2)2 (2(ak − kτ − d) + 1).
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R(λad, β, a, d, k,m) where R(.) has positive value.16 Therefore, the first-period con-
strained cooperative input price is greater than the monopsony one.
Proposition 4. Given that the same duty is imposed in period t ≥ 2, the critical
discount rate which supports first period full cooperation in an upstream market can
be lower than the one supporting full cooperation under free trade.
Proof of proposition 4. To show that cooperation is easier to sustain under the an-
tidumping duty, we need to show that the value of the critical discount rate β which
supports first period full cooperation under the antidumping duty is lower than β.
As proved in Proposition 2, when β < β, full cooperation is not sustainable at t > 1
because everyone knows that someone will deviate at some period t > 1. Therefore,
we will consider only full cooperation at the first period with constrained coopera-
tion at the future period t ≥ 2. We refer this game to “restricted full cooperation”.
At every period t ≥ 2, the constrained cooperative static profit is πcc(τ(w1), β). At












(w + d+m)− p(w,w) = 0. (3.38)
Define the restricted full cooperative price as the solution to wmc1 (β, 0) =
w1(w
mc(β, 0), 0). We can obtain the value for the restricted full cooperative price
16The full value of the first-period constrained cooperative input price can be found in appendix
A.
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Define the restricted full cooperative profit at the first period as πmc1 (β, 0) = π1(w
mc
1 (β, 0), 0)
The restricted fully cooperative price is supported when the total payoff from
the full cooperation is greater than the total payoff from deviation;






The condition in equation 3.39 holds only if
β ≥ βad.18 (3.40)
Recall the critical discount rate under free trade is β; thus,
βad − β ≤ 0 (3.41)
is a necessary condition for full cooperation to be sustainable in the first period
when there is an antidumping duty in place (as compared to free trade).







and µad2 = (1/(2β(1 + k)2(3 + 4k2)2(β − (3 + 4k2)2)2))(−4k(1 + k)2(1 − 2d + 2ak)(1 + 2k2)(3 +
4k2)4 + 4β5k(1 + k)2(1 − 2d + 2ak)(1 + 2k2)(5 + 8k2)(7 + 8k2) − β4(3 + 4k2)2((1 − 2d)(−1 +
k(17 + 2k(15 + 8k(3 + 2k(2 + k))))) + 2a(−2 + k(1 + k(15 + 16k(2 + k(3 + 2k(2 + k)))))) +
4(1 + k2)m) + β(3 + 4k2)4((1 − 2d)(9 + k(−1 + 58k + 96k3 + 32k5)) + 2a(18 + k(−9 + k(65 +
8k(−1 + 2k(5 + k+ 2k2)))))− 4(1 + k2)(3 + 4k2)2m) + β2((1− 2d)(567 + k(13 + 2k(3631 + 2k(9 +
2k(4562 +k(3 + 4k(2971 + 8k2(545 + 450k2 + 192k4 + 32k6)))))))) + 2a(1134 +k(−567 +k(11083 +
4k(−952 + k(11349 + 2k(−1108 + k(12687 + 32k(−25 + k(524 + k(21 + 2k(205 + 4k(5 + 2k(11 +
k+ 2k2)))))))))))))− 4(1 + k2)(3 + 4k2)4(7 + 24k2 + 16k4)m)− β3(3 + 4k2)2((1− 2d)(17 + k(83 +
2k(141 + 2k(135 + 2k(138 + k(153 + 8k(25 + 6k(3 + k(2 + k))))))))) + 2a(34 + k(−17 + k(213 +
4k(38 + k(175 + 2k(118 + k(161 + 48k(4 + k(3 + k(2 + k))))))))))− 4(1 + k2)(17 + 48k2 + 32k4)m)).
18The absolute value of the critical discount rate βad is shown in appendix A.
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of discount rate which supports the restricted full-
cooperation cooperation under free trade and Antidumping
antidumping duty is shown in figure 3.2. The dashed line represents the critical
discount rate under the free trade scenario while the solid line represents the criti-
cal discount rate which supports restricted full cooperation under the antidumping
scenario given a certain value of exogenous variable (a, d, k). As shown in figure
3.2, for small value of exogenous profit margin given by the antidumping authority
m, the critical discount rate under the antidumping duty is the as free trade one.
With high value of m the critical value lower than the one under free trade19.
Proposition 4 shows that full cooperation in the first period is not affected by
the antidumping duty if the exogenous profit margin, m, is small enough to prohibit
the antidumping duty from coming into effect, i.e. wi1 + d + m ≤ pi1(wi1wj1). On
the other hand, if m is such that wi1 + d + m > pi1(wi1, wj1), it is easier to sustain
19Although we change the value of exogenous variable (a, d, k), the critical discount rate under
the antidumping duty still βad is lower than the free trade’s one. See the combination use for the
numerical analysis in appendix A
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restricted full cooperation under antidumping. Moreover, the critical discount rate
βad, which supports the restricted full cooperative outcome under antidumping duty,
is weakly increasing the exogenous profit margin given by the antidumping authority
(m). However, if m is too large providing a negative profit (as m is greater than
0.6 in figure 3.2), the processors will stop playing the game. Thus, restricted full
cooperation can be sustain more easily when m is intermediate. This is because m
reduces the future gain from cooperation, so the processors have more motivation
to deviate when m is large. Therefore, with intermediate value of m allowing the
duty is positive, the antidumping is pro-collusive.
In short, when β < β only full cooperation that can be sustained is restricted
full cooperation. When the exogenous profit margin given by the antidumping
authority m is small, there is no threat of an antidumping duty, so the processors
play constrained cooperation from the initial period, same as free trade. However,
when there is a credible threat of the antidumping duty, then anxiety over the future
duty reduces benefit from current deviation, helping to sustain present cooperation.
The result suggests that a policy maker should be aware of a change in a processor’s




Empirical model and estimation results
In the theory section, we found that, under some certain conditions, the an-
tidumping duty is pro-collusive, i.e. it is easier to sustain collusion under the an-
tidumping duty. Thus, the primary objective of this section is to develop an em-
pirical model that can be used to measure collusion (market power) in Thai shrimp
market. Also we attempt to test the theoretical results of whether the U.S. an-
tidumping duty on frozen shrimp has an effect on collusion in the Thai fresh shrimp
market.
Although much of the literature on Thai shrimp, shrimp is considered an
important industry in Thailand (Krasachat(1987), Krasachat and Manerat (1991),
Samapat (1994), Ling (1996), Malisorn (1996), Iamlaor(1998), Raubrhoo (2002),
Potathanapong(2002)), these studies only focus on Thai shrimp on the international
level. The structure of domestic shrimp market has been ignored. This is because
fresh shrimp production data is not sufficient enough. The fresh shrimp production
data is usually collected annually and the shrimp size is not specified while the
shrimp price significantly varies by shrimp size. Different from previous studies,
by using fixed-proportion technology, frozen shrimp import/export by size can be
used as the amount of fresh shrimp production which allows us to estimate for
Thai fresh shrimp supply. Thus, we are able to analyze the structure of the Thai
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shrimp domestic market and the existence of collusion/market power within the
Thai shrimp market.
4.1 The empirical industry organization approach
The approach widely used to test market power defines market power as some
deviation of price from marginal cost1 . The gap between price and marginal cost is
estimated as an unknown parameter from observable price and quantity data. The
models are broadly classified into two groups : conjectural variation models and
comparative statistics models.
1. Conjectural Variation Models –estimate cost directly (Schroeter 1988, Schroeter
and Azzam1990, Azzam and Pagoulatos 1990)
A conjectural variation model is defined as a firm’s “belief or expection” about
its rivals’ reaction to a decrease (increase) in its own output’s price (output
supply) in the case of an oligopoly or a increase in its own input’s price (in-
put employment) in the case of oligosony. The basic model makes use of the
following marginal revenue and marginal cost specification
p(1− θ
η







where p and w denote output and input prices, η and ξ are output and input
1The prior approach widely used to test market power was ”Structure-Conduct-Performance”
(SCP) approach. In SCP approach, price is regressed on a measure of concentration and a set
of variables. A statistically significant coefficient for concentration is interpreted as an evidence
for market power. However, one of the major criticisms of the SPC approach is its treatment of
conduct. A significant price-concentration correlation is taken to imply noncompetitive conduct
because the latter is implicitly ”assumed” to be determined by concentration (Weliwita 1995).
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supply elasticities, θ and φ are output and input market conjectural elastici-
ties2, and ∂C
∂Q
denotes other marginal input costs. If the firm is a price taker
(or the market is perfectly competitive), so that it does not expect a change in
the industry output (input) as a result of a change in its own output (input),
then the conjecture is that equal zero. The conjectures equal one under the
monopoly/monopsony. An oligopoly/oligopsony is assumed to fall within the
continuum.
However, the conjectural variation models have shortcomings. First, firms are
assumed to form conjectures on rivals’ respones to their actions as if it involves
in a dynamic game. Although, the model is derived from a statistic profit
maximization problem. Second, the prior restrictions imposed on demand
and cost functions in empirical estimation makes it is unclear if the estimated
price-cost margin is the result of firms’ collusive behavior or a by-product of
a prior restriction (Koontz, et al 1993 and Weliwita 1995).
2. Comparative Statistics Models3
The comparative statistics models attempt to find the market structure consis-
tent with equilibrium outcomes following an exogenous shock to the industry.
Bresnahan (1989) identified four types of comparative statistic models
• Comparative statistics in demand (supply) (Azzam and Park 1993,Weli-
2For example, θ = ∂Q∂Qi
Qi
Q . It is defined as the firm’s precieved rate of the change of the industry
output (Q) with respect to a unit change in its own output in the case of quantity setting game.
Moreover, in the price setting game, θ = ∂p∂pi
pi
p
3More detail can be found in Bresnahan(1989)
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wita 1995)4
• Comparative statistics in demand (supply) shock (Lee and Porter 1984,
Koontz et al 1993)5
• Comparative statistics in industry structure (Lamm 1981 and Cotterill
1986)6
• Comparative statistics in costs (Panzar and Rosse 1987) 7
In this chapter, we use comparative statistics in supply to test for the collusive
behavior (market power) in the Thai shrimp market. Unlike Azzam and Park (1993)
and Weliwita (1995), where the evidence of collusion is defined as change in a firm’s
quantity with respect to its rival change in quantity, we define collusion as change in
a firm’s price with respect to its rival change in price. Moreover, we also include the
antidumping variable to capture the effect of antidumping duty on the processors’
(exporters’) collusion in their upstream (input) market.
4The comparative statistics in demand (supply) can reveal the degree of collusion (
oligopoly/oligosony power) by the rotation in demand (supply) curve.
5Green and Porter (1984) develop the model which has become known as “trigger price”
oligopoly model. This model shows how collusive prices can be interrupted by noncooperative
price under demand uncertainty. Under imperfect information, firms do not know exactly their
rivals’ output, and firms may respond to substantial price declines by acting more competitively for
a period of time, even if price declines because of an exogenous source. In the comparative statis-
tics in demand (supply) shock model, the error terms in demand (supply) relations can identify
two regimes–noncooperative and collusive.
6This model treats concentration as exogenous to the industry. A significant and positive
(negative) correlation between output (input) price and producer concentration is interpreted as
an evidence of oligopoly (oligosony) power.
7This model is based on estimating the reduced-form revenue equation for a firm which is the
total revenue for a single firm and equals the product of the equilibrium quantity and price. The





where R(.) is a firm’s reduced form revenue, wit is an input price, Yt is a vector of demand shifters,
and Zit is a vector of cost shifters. HR is a measure of the percentage change in equilibrium
revenues caused by one percent increase in the input price.
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Figure 4.1: Shift in supply curve
4.2 Comparative static in supply
To see how comparative statics in supply reveal the degree of oligopsony col-
lusion/power in the input market, following Bresnahan (1982), the equilibrium for a
monopsonist E1 in figure 4.1 where the equilibrium input price w1 and the quantity
y1 are determined at the intersection of the marginal factor cost ME1, associated
with the input supply S1, and demand of a monopsony Dm. On the other hand,
The same equilibrium input price and quantity can be generated by the perfect
competitive industry where the demand curve Dc intersects the supply curve S1.
Since both markets generate the same input price and quantity at the equilibrium,
we cannot identify whether these input prices and quantities have been derived by
a perfectly competitive industry or by a monopsony.
Suppose S1 parallelly shifts to S2 due to an exogenous shock to the input
supply. The new equilibrium is at E2. However, the same equilibrium input price w2
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Figure 4.2: Rotate in supply curve
and quantity y2 can still derived by either a monopsony or a competitive industry.
Thus, a parallel shift in the input supply curve cannot distinguish between the
monopsony and perfect competition. This raises the question of an identification
problem, the solution to which requires a rotation rather than a parallel shift of the
input supply curve around the initial equilibrium E1 to distinguish the monopsony
equilibrium from the perfect competition equilibrium. As illustrated in figure 4.2,
we rotate S1 around the initial equilibrium E1 to get the new input supply curve S3.
The equilibrium input price and quantity under perfect competition is still the same
before and after the rotation. On the other hand, under monopsony, the marginal
factor cost also shifts to ME3 resulting in a new equilibrium at E3 which is different
from the equilibrium under perfect competition.
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4.3 The empirical model
We extend our assumption in the theory section from dual processors to n
multiple processors. Let the inverse demand of frozen shrimp in the U.S. market
that processor i in period t faces be
pit = fit (yit, ADit(wi,t−1), G) + ε (4.3)
where yit is processor i’s frozen shrimp supply, ADit(wi,t−1) is the antidumping duty
which depends on processor i’s fresh shrimp price in the previous period ( wi,t−1 ),
and G is a vector of exogenous factors that shift frozen shrimp demand. The error ε
is an unobservable fluctuation in frozen shrimp demand. From the fixed-proportion
technology assumption, we can denote both input (fresh shrimp), xit and output
(frozen shrimp), yit by the same notation.
yit = xit (4.4)
Thus, processor i faces fresh shrimp supply
yit = git(wit, H) + υ (4.5)
where wit is a frozen shrimp price offered by processor i, H is a vector of exogenous
factors that shift fresh shrimp supply, and the error υ is unobservable fluctuation in
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fresh shrimp supply. Processor i’s short run profit at period t is8
πit(w) = [pit(yit(wt, H, υ), ADit(wi,t−1), G, ε)− wit(1 + ADit(wi,t−1))] yit(wt, H, υ)
−c(yit(wt, H, υ), D) (4.6)
where wit is price of fresh shrimp offered by processor i.
9 c(yit(w,H, υ), D, ) is cost
of non-material input where D is a vector of non-material input.




















−yit(.)(1 + ADit(.)) = 0 (4.7)
Denote the change in processor i’s fresh shrimp supply or the change in pro-





Moreover, we assume that the effect on processor i’s procurement due to a change
in processor j’s fresh shrimp price is smaller than its own price effect10. Denote the
8from the theory section, with the normalization factor (1−β) the total profit in repeated-game
is the same as the single-period profit.
9Although the antidumping duty is imposed on frozen shrimp (output), the profit is written
in this fashion because we expect that the antidumping duty affects collusion and input (fresh
shrimp) price in upstream market.
10We also assume that processor i’s procurement responds to change in his rivals is the same
across firms. Moreover, we also assume a symmetry from the theoretical model which results in
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where n is number of processors in the market.



















is the average change in fresh shrimp price offered
by the other processors with respect to the change in processor i’s fresh shrimp price
which represents the collusive behavior. For noncooperative behavior, the processors
play Bertrand competition, so φi equals zero. Otherwise, φi > 0 which provides
evidence of collusion. Because only aggregate industrial data are available, we need










(1− φ)γ − yt(.)(1 + ADt(.)) = 0 (4.11)
where pt(.) and wt are frozen shrimp and fresh shrimp market price in period t.




non-material marginal cost , and φ is the industrial average change in fresh shrimp
all other processors responding equally to a change in the offer price by processor i
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price across firms.
Define the mark up as the difference between frozen shrimp price and fresh











This mark up equation will be estimated together with frozen shrimp demand and
fresh shrimp supply to obtain evidence of collusion (φ).
Assume U.S. demand for Thai frozen shrimp and Thai supply of fresh shrimp,
respectively, have a linear form. Thus,
pt = α0 + α1yt + α2ADt + αmG+ ε (4.13)
and
yt = β0 + β1wt + βmH + υ (4.14)
where αi and βi are parameters to be estimated. Given demand and supply in








Furthermore, since the antidumping duty on Thai frozen shrimp does not
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change during the study period, the AD variable is treated as a dummy variable;
ADt =

1 when the antidumping duty is imposed
0 otherwise.
(4.17)
Thus, the ADt variable does not capture only the effect of the U.S. antidumping
duty on Thai frozen shrimp but capture the total effect of the U.S. antidumping
duty impacting Thai shrimp market.
Also, assuming a quadratic non-material cost function, the total marginal non-
material cost ( ∂c(.)
∂yt(.)
+ ADt) is specified as
∂c(.)
∂yt(.)
+ ADt = δ0 + δ1yt + δ2ADt + δmD + η (4.18)
where D is a vector of exogenous factors which shift the non-material marginal cost,
and δi is a parameter to be estimated. η is an error term in non-material marginal
cost function.
Substituting equation 4.15, 4.16, and 4.18 into the mark up equation 4.12,
equation 4.12 becomes
Mt = δ0 +
δco
β1
yt(1 + ADt) + δ11yt + δ2ADt + δmD + η (4.19)
where δco =
1
(1−φ) , and δ11 = δ1 − α1. However, it is not possible to disentangle
φ in equation 4.19 although the estimate for β1 can be obtained by estimating the
supply equation separately. A rotation in the supply equation is needed to identify
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φ (Bresnahan (1982,1989), Azzam and Park (1993))11. Thus, an interaction term
is included into the supply equation 4.14 involving w and an exogenous variable
(average rainfall (R)). An exogenous non-market input which is rainfall is chosen as
the supply rotator because higher level of rainfall yields higher production level of
fresh shrimp resulting in a lower marginal cost while changing in other cost such as
price of baby shrimp, wage, and price of diesel directly results in changing marginal
costs by the absolute amount12. Thus, interacting the price of fresh shrimp with
rainfall causes supply curve to rotate while interacting fresh shrimp price with other
production costs will result to a shift in supply curve rather than rotation. The new
supply function is
yt = β0 + β1wt + β2wtRt + βmH + υ. (4.20)




= β1 + β2Rt. (4.21)
Substitute equation 4.21 into the mark up equation 4.19:











AD. The coefficient of y∗t is an average measure
of the degree of collusion in the input (fresh shrimp) market without an antidumping
11The detail is already discussed in section 4.2
12More detail is discussed in Appendix B.2
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effect, and the coefficient of y∗ad is an average measure of the degree of collusion
associated with the antidumping duty.13 The coefficient of AD ( σ2 ) measures
the direct impact of the antidumping protection. Under the assumption that the
degree of collusion is not affected by other exogenous variables in equation 4.22, The
estimate can be obtained by estimating equations 4.13, 4.20, and 4.22. Note there
is a mismatch between our theoretical and empirical analyses. As Proposition 4 lays
out, in our theoretical model the threat of a certain and eternal anti-dumping duty
in future periods affects collusion in periods before the penalty is actually applied,
but not during the penalty stage. In contrast, our empirical anslysis finds collusion
is affected during the penalty stage. We are not troubled by this mismatch. As
mentioned above, the theoretical model assumes the penalty is certain and eternal.
In practice, the anti-dumping duty is an uncertain threat in the pre-penalty stage:
even during the investigation phase, processors are uncertain whether they will
face any dumping margin at all. Thus, the threat of future punishment is more
credible once a dumping duty has already been imposed. Moreover, once inflicted,
the dumping margin (duty level) is recalculated annually, and so, even during the
penalty phase, processors are facing the threat of future penalties that are contingent
on current behavior, with concomitant implications for collusion.
Although the error terms in demand, supply and the mark up equations are
expected to be correlated, the three equations can still be estimated consistently
using instruments for the included endogenous variables in these equations. As a
13There is no incidence of collusion in downstream market; for example, the market share of
Thai frozen shrimp in the U.S. market is only 17 -30 % , and price of Thai frozen shrimp declines
during the study period (USITC 2009). Thus, we believe that the collusion estimate in this model
only represents collusion in the upstream market.
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result we can estimate fresh shrimp supply to obtain β1 and β2 which will be used
to construct the exogenous variables (y∗t and y
∗
ad) in the mark up equation.
4.4 Data collection
Monthly data for the period from January 1996 to January 2009 are used for
the estimation. The description of variables and the sources of data are as follows:
1. pt =monthly price of Thai frozen shrimp in the U.S. by size (dollar/kg) Source:
the U.S. International Trade Committee
2. yt =monthly quantity of Thai frozen shrimp imported to the U.S. by size (kg)
Source: the U.S. International Trade Committee
3. wt =monthly price of fresh shrimp (Baht/kg) in Thai shrimp center market
(Mahachai Market) by size and species Source: Charoen Pokphand Foods
(CPF) group.
4. M =Processors’ market mark up=p− w
5. G =Another exogenous variable which shift the demand equation
• xr =monthly exchange rate (Baht/1U.S.dollar) Source: Bank of Thai-
land
6. H =Other exogenous variables which shift the supply equation (use time lag14)
• R = rainfall (mm) Source: Thai Meteorological Department
14More detail is in next section
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• gas =monthly price of diesel (Baht/liter) Source: Petroleum division,Energy
Policy and planning office, Ministry of Energy, Thailand
• wage = labor cost minimum wage rate (Baht/ day) Source: Thai Ministry
of Labor
• wbs =price of baby shrimp (Baht / 1000head) Source: Charoen Pokphand
Foods (CPF) group.
7. G = other exogenous variables which shift non-material marginal cost equation
• gas =monthly price of diesel (Baht/liter) Source: Petroleum division,Energy
Policy and planning office, Ministry of Energy, Thailand
• wage = minimum wage rate (Baht/day) Source: Thai Ministry of Labor
4.5 Estimation procedure
The error terms from the frozen shrimp demand equation (4.13), fresh shrimp
supply equation (4.20), and the mark up relation equation (4.22) are assumed to
be correlated. However, since the estimates from the fresh shrimp supply equation
are used to create the variables y∗t and y
∗
ad in the mark up relation equation, the
fresh shrimp supply equation has to be estimated separately. Even though the
supply equation is estimated separately, we still can obtain consistent estimates
for the parameters in the supply equation if exogenous variables excluded from the
supply equation are used as an instrument for the included endogenous variable
(wt) in supply equation. Therefore, the method of two-stage least squares is used
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to estimate the supply equation.
Several modifications for the supply equation are made. First, all data in Thai
Baht is converted to U.S. dollar. The shipment process from Thailand to the U.S.
takes about a month, so the quantity (yt) used in the supply equation is a month lead
quantity (lead y). Fresh shrimp price (wt) data is specified by size and species while
the quantity data is only specified by size; therefore, we do some modifications with
the fresh shrimp price data as follows. The black tiger prawn (Penaeus Monodon)
price is used in the estimation from the period 1996-2002 while the fresh shrimp
price since 2005 used in the estimation is the white shrimp (Penaeus Vanamei)
price. This is because black tiger prawns had dominated all other shrimp species in
Thailand until 2002; white shrimp was commercially introduced15 and became the
major shrimp species after 200516. Moreover, white shrimp also dominates the other
in the export sector. During the transition period (2003 and 2004), the fresh shrimp
price is weighted by the shrimp production proportion of each species. Ideally, we
would like to have each species’ production data by size and month. Unfortunately,
the production data which we have is only annual production data by species. As a
result, we have to assume that the production proportion of these two species is the
same in each size and month. From the Office of Agricultural Economics Statistic
Yearbook, the shrimp production was 194,909 and 132,365 for black tiger prawn and
white shrimp respectively (or about 0.6 and 0.3 of the total shrimp production for
black tiger prawn and white shrimp respectively). The black tiger prawn and white
15The white shrimp was first introduced in Thailand in 2002, but it was not commercial until
2003
16In 2005, white shrimp production was 374,487 tons while black tiger prawn production was
only 20,055 tons (Office of Agricultural Economics, 2008)
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shrimp production in 2004 were 106,884 and 251,697 tons respectively (or about 0.3
and 0.7 of the total production). Thus, the fresh shrimp prices in the transition
periods are weighted by using this ratio (black:white, 0.6:0.3 and 0.3:0.7 for 2003
and 2004 respectively). In addition, during 2003-2005, the production technology
of white shrimp was not efficient enough to produce large shrimp (30 heads per
kilogram), so the fresh shrimp price for the large shrimp (30 heads per kilogram) is
the black tiger prawn. Moreover, to capture the difference in supply between shrimp
species, we also include specie variable which is 1 during black tiger prawn culturing
period, 2 during the transition period, and 3 during white shrimp culturing period.
The rainfall data is the monthly total rainfall by province. Since each province
has a different area of shrimp farm, each province’s rainfall is weighted by a ratio
of province’s shrimp farm area and the total shrimp area17. Therefore, the rainfall
data used in the estimation is the sum of weighted monthly rainfall from 25 shrimp
farming provinces. Time lag price of the baby shrimp (lag wbs), price of diesel
(lag gas), wage (lag wage), and rainfall (lag R) are used as supply shifters. Each
shrimp size and species has different culture period; for example, it takes about six
months to culture large black tiger prawn (30 heads per kilogram), but it takes only
five months to culture large white shrimp. While the culture period for small black
tiger prawn (80 heads per kilogram) is three months18. Thus, these supply shifters
are average values of culture period19.
A necessary condition to identify the oligosony collusion parameter is to rotate
17See appendix B.1 for the provinces used in this estimation
18More detail can be found from table B.1 in appendix B.3.
19The detail on culture period by size and year are in table B.2 in appendix B.3
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the fresh shrimp supply curve. To do so, an interaction term between price of
fresh shrimp wt and an exogenous variable is added into the supply equation for
fresh shrimp. Several experiments were done involving the interaction term such as
lag wbs and lag wage. The best fit was obtained when lag R is interacted with wt.
To capture the month variation in the fresh shrimp supply, eleven month dummies
( Imonth 2−12) are included in the equation. We also include seven year dummies
(1997-2008) to capture the year variation. Moreover, trend and trend2 variables
are included to capture trend effect in the supply equation. To capture the cost
variation for different shrimp sizes, seven size dummies, for the second largest size
to the smallest size, are also included into the fresh shrimp supply equation.
The price of Thai frozen shrimp in the U.S. market (Pt) is chosen to be an
instrumental variable for price of fresh shrimp (wt). This is because most of Thai
shrimp production is exported, so the domestic price of fresh shrimp is usually
influenced by the export price. Moreover, it takes about a month for a shipment from
Thailand to arrive at the U.S., so the price of frozen shrimp in the U.S. market is not
affected by the domestic price of fresh shrimp in the same period. In addition, the
AD dummy variable is used as another instrument to capture for the antidumping
effect on fresh shrimp price. AD is equal to one when the antidumping duty is
imposed.
The final estimating model for fresh shrimp supply is
lead y = β0 + β1w + β2wR + β3lag wbs + β4lag gas+ β5lag wage+ β6specie
+βisI size+ βimI month+ βyI year + β7trend+ β8trend
2 + υ.(4.23)
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Thus, eight specifications are experimented for the supply estimation
1. equation 4.23
2. equation 4.23 without lag gas
3. equation 4.23 without lag labor
4. equation 4.23 without lag wbs
5. equation 4.23 without lag gas and lag wage
6. equation 4.23 without lag gas and lag wbs
7. equation 4.23 without lag wagw and lag wbs
8. equation 4.23 without any cost of fresh shrimp production–lag gas, lag wage,
and lag wbs
Next, we construct the y∗t and y
∗
ad variables for the mark up relation equation
(equation 4.22 ) using the estimates from specification (8).20 Then we estimate U.S.
demand for Thai frozen shrimp and the mark up relation separately by the using
two-stage least squares method. Exogenous variables in the fresh shrimp supply
(equation 4.23 specification (8)) are chosen to be instruments for the endogenous
variable (yt).
Several modifications for the U.S. demand for Thai frozen shrimp are exper-
imented with. First, we set all variables in frozen shrimp demand equation corre-
sponding to the fresh shrimp supply. To do so, we use one month lead price and
20As we will see in the empirical results section that all cost of fresh shrimp production from
other specifications provides unexpected signs
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quantity of frozen shrimp (lead p and lead y), and exchange rate (lead xr) since
the shipment from Thailand to the U.S. period is about a month. To capture the
seasonal variation in the demand for frozen shrimp, three seasonal dummies (D2,
D3, and D4) representing second, third, and fourth quarters of a year are included
in the demand equation. Year dummies are included in the demand equation to
capture the year variation in frozen shrimp demand. We also include a trend vari-
able to capture the long term trends in demand equation21. Moreover, to capture
the antidumping effect on the U.S. demand for Thai frozen shrimp, we include an
AD dummy variable which is one when the duty is imposed and zero otherwise.
To capture the demand variation for the different shrimp sizes, seven size dummies,
from the second largest size to the smallest size, are also included into the frozen
shrimp demand equation.
The final estimating model for frozen shrimp demand is
lead p = α0+α1lead y+α2lead xr+α3AD+α4trend+αDiDi+αisI size+αiyI year+ε
(4.24)
Two specifications are experimented with for the demand equation
1. equation 4.24
2. substitute seasonal dummies by month dummies ( Imonth 2− 12)
There are some modifications being made in the mark up equation. First, due
to the shipment process, the mark up (M), which is the difference between frozen
21We also included trend square variable in the demand equation, but it subsequently dropped
from the model during the estimation.
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shrimp and fresh shrimp prices, is modified as the difference between a month lead
price of frozen shrimp and the current price of fresh shrimp ( lead p − w). For
the same reason, we use one-month lead constructed variable (lead y∗) in the mark
up equation. Diesel price and wage are included to capture non-material cost of
frozen shrimp production. Moreover, size, month, and year dummies are included
to capture size, month, and year variations in non-material cost of frozen shrimp
production. In addition, the dummy variable AD is used to capture the cost of
facing antidumping duty where AD equals one if the antidumping duty is imposed
and zero otherwise. We also include trend and trend2 variables to capture for trend
effect in the mark up equation.
The final estimating model for the mark up equation is
M = δ0 + δcolead y
∗ + δadlead y
∗
ad + δ11lead y + δ2AD + δ3gas+ δ4wage+ δ5trend
+δ6trend
2 + δisI size+ δimI month+ δiyI year + η. (4.25)
Eight specifications are experienced for the mark up equation estimation
1. equation 4.25
2. equation 4.25 without gas
3. equation 4.25 without wage
4. equation 4.25 without AD
5. equation 4.25 without wage and gas
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6. equation 4.25 without gas and AD
7. equation 4.25 without wage and AD
8. equation 4.25 withoutwage, gas, and AD
4.6 Empirical results
4.6.1 Fresh shrimp supply
The estimation results are in table 4.1.22 All specifications result in a posi-
tive and significant coefficient for the fresh shrimp price (w) but results indicate a
negative significant coefficient for the interaction term at 1% significance level. The
supply elasticity is between 0.34 to 0.63 from all specifications.
The costs of fresh shrimp production (lag baby shrimp price (lag wbs) , wage
(lag wage), and diesel price (lag gas)) are expected to have negative impact on the
fresh shrimp supply. However, the estimation results give positive signs for all costs.
• Lag baby shrimp price (lag wbs) : The results show a significantly positive sign
for all specifications (specification (1), (2), (3), and (5)) at the 1 % significance
level. This might be because the lag price of baby shrimp also contains a baby
shrimp demand element. Thereby, higher baby shrimp price means more baby
shrimp in the baby shrimp market. Consequently, more baby shrimp results
to more fresh shrimp production.
• Lag wage (lag wage): The results show a negative sign in specification (1)


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and (4) while other specifications (specification (2) and (7) ) give a positive
sign. However, none of the results are significant. The positive sign on the
wage coefficient might be because the wage variable also contains fresh shrimp
demand element. Higher wage results in more purchase power for people.
• Diesel price (lag gas): All specifications ( specification (1), (3), (4), and (6)
) give a positive sign. This may be a result of failure to account for diesel
used for running machinery in shrimp farms; large shrimp farms usually use
electricity to run their machines rater than diesel. However, none of the results
are significant.
Rainfall (R) is expected to have positive impact on fresh shrimp supply. The
results are as expected. The coefficients are significantly positive in all specifications
at the 1 % significance level. The species dummy is expected to be positive because
white shrimp yields better production than black tiger prawn. The results are as
expected. The coefficient is positive and significant in all specifications at the 1%
significance level.
Size of shrimp has a significant impact on fresh shrimp supply. All coefficients
for shrimp size are significantly positive at the 1% significance level. Thus, cost of
fresh shrimp production for the small size is lower than the large size23.
23Recall, for the size dummies, the dummy for the largest size is omitted.
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4.6.2 Frozen shrimp demand
The estimation results are shown in table 4.2.24 As expected, the frozen shrimp
quantity (lead y) has a negative sign on the frozen shrimp price in the demand equa-
tion. The coefficients are significant for both specifications at 1 % and 5 % signifi-
cance levels. The exchange rate (lead xr) impact is also as expected, although the
coefficients are insignificant in both specifications. Thai exchange rate depreciation
results in a lower price for frozen shrimp in the U.S. market.
The AD dummy has an insignificant negative impact on price of frozen shrimp
in the U.S. market. This is consist with our assumption that when the antidumping
duty is imposed, the processors (exporters) lower the price of fresh shrimp in order
to keep them being competitive in the U.S. frozen shrimp market. As a result, the
price of frozen shrimp does not increase when the duty is imposed.
The trend variable is significantly negative for the both specifications at the
1 % significance level. This implies a decline in the price of Thai frozen shrimp in
the U.S. over the study period. The dummies for size of shrimp are significantly
negative on price of frozen shrimp for both specifications at the 1 % significance
level. The smaller shrimp size, the lower the price of frozen shrimp.
4.6.3 Mark up
The estimation results are shown in table 4.3.25 The mark up equation contains
the oligopsony mark up (δcolead y
∗ and δadlead y
∗
ad ) and the marginal non-material
24The coefficients of year and month dummies are not reported in this table
25The coefficients of year and month dummies are not reported in this table
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Table 4.2: Estimation results for U.S. demand for Thai frozen shrimp
specification
(1) (2)
lead y -0.00112*** -0.00158***
(0.0003) (0.0005)






Isize 6 -2.080*** -2.050***
(0.10) (0.11)
Isize 9 -2.924*** -2.823***
(0.12) (0.15)
Isize 12 -4.024*** -3.756***
(0.20) (0.29)
Isize 15 -5.196*** -4.845***
(0.25) (0.37)
Isize 18 -6.606*** -6.434***
(0.15) (0.20)
Isize 21 -7.176*** -6.979***
(0.16) (0.22)






Standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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cost of processing frozen shrimp. The marginal processing cost is expressed as a
function of lead y, gas, and wage. The non-material costs are expected to have a
positive impact on the mark up. The coefficient on wage is positive in all spec-
ifications, but it is not significant in any specifications. On the other hand, the
coefficient on gas is insignificantly negative. This may be a result of a failure to ac-
count for transportation costs in frozen shrimp industry. Time is entered as a trend
variable into the model to capture the long-term trend in the marginal processing
cost. A negative coefficient indicates a decline in the marginal cost of processing
over the study period; however, the coefficient is not significant. The coefficient for
the lead y in the mark up equation represents the slope of the marginal processing
cost. This coefficient is significantly positive at the 1 % significance level. This im-
plies an increasing marginal cost of processing frozen shrimp over the study period.
Also, the coefficient on AD, which captures the direct effect of the antidumping
duty on the mark up equation, has a positive sign in most of the specifications except
the specification (5). However, none of the specification are significant. Shrimp size
dummies significantly have a negative impact on the mark up at the 1 % significance
level which means the largest shrimp have the highest mark up.
The coefficient on lead y∗ is significantly positive in most specifications at the
5 % and 10 % significance levels except in specification (2). This indicates that Thai
shrimp exporters are colluding in Thai shrimp market regardless of the presence of
the antidumping duty. Finally, the coefficient on lead y∗ad is positive and significant





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The objective of this dissertation is to develop a model capable of examining
how the antidumping duty influences collusive behavior in an upstream market.
The motivation comes from the fact that the price of Thai frozen shrimp in the
U.S. market does not increase after the imposition of the U.S. antidumping duty
on frozen shrimp imports from Thailand along with other five shrimp exporting
countries. Moreover, the four-firm concentration ratio of Thai shrimp exporters
increased from 38.88% to 65.23% after the imposition of the duty. One would
suspect collusion and market power of Thai shrimp exporters (processors) within
the Thai shrimp market, and whether the imposition of the antidumping duty results
in a higher degree of collusion among Thai shrimp exporters.
Opposite from previous studies in the antidumping effect on collusion, this
dissertation focuses on collusion in the upstream (input) market. We employ a
Bertrand duopoly model with infinite periods to investigate the effect of the an-
tidumping duty on collusive behavior. With perfect monitoring assumption, we find
that the exporters (processors) will fully cooperate and behave as a monopsony in
their input market under a certain set of the discount rates. This set of the discount
rate is not affected by an exogenous tariff or the antidumping duty being imposed on
downstream goods. We suspect that this is because of the linearity in input supply
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and output demand assumption imposed in this model.
However, although the discount rate is not sufficiently high enough to support
the fully cooperative behavior, the exporters (processors) are still able to exercise the
collusive behavior through a self-enforcing agreement. The self-enforcing agreement
prevents the processors to deviate from the collusive behavior by restricting the gain
from deviation to be less than the punishment in the future. We refer the cooperation
with a self-enforcing agreement to the constrained cooperative behavior. Under the
constrained cooperative behavior, the processors are more willing to cooperate when
the discount rate is high; this is because the punishment in the future becomes more
severe. On the other hand, the exogenous tariff on the downstream goods results
in the processors being less willing to cooperate due to the fact that it decreases
the punishment in the future. Under the antidumping duty, with the self-enforcing
agreement in future periods, the full cooperation among the exporters (processors)
in the initial period is feasible under a certain set of the discount rate. We refer this
cooperation to the restricted full-cooperative behavior. Under the assumption that
the antidumping duty depends only on the exporters’ (processors’) initial behaviors,
the set of discount rates which supports the restricted full-cooperation is larger than
the one supporting the full cooperation under free trade. Thus, it is easier to sustain
collusion under the antidumping duty. In other words, the threat of the antidumping
duty on downstream goods is pro-collusive in the upstream market.
We test our theoretical findings by applying empirical models to the Thai
shrimp industry during 1996-2009. The fresh shrimp production data is not suffi-
cient enough to estimate fresh shrimp supply which as prevented previous studies to
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examine the Thai shrimp market structure. With fixed-proportion technology as-
sumption, we can estimate for Thai fresh shrimp supply using import/export frozen
shrimp data as fresh shrimp production. Thus, this dissertation is able to study the
structure of the Thai shrimp market. We estimate the system of Thai fresh shrimp
supply, the U.S. demand for Thai frozen shrimp, and the mark up equations. We use
the comparative static in supply approach with an interaction between fresh shrimp
price and rainfall as a supply rotator to identify collusive behavor. The effect of
antidumping on the exporters’ (processors’) collusion in the Thai shrimp market is
empirically tested by estimating a mark up which is the difference between frozen
and fresh shrimp prices. Our empirical results confirm the theoretical finding; the
antidumping duty significantly increases the degree of collusion among Thai shrimp
exporters (processors) at the 1 % significant level.
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Appendix A
Cooperation under Antidumping case




ad, β, a, d, k,m)




R1 = −16k(1 + k)(1 + k2)(1 + 2k2)(15 + k(−7 + 4k(10 − 3k + 6k2)))(15 + k(7 +
12k(6+k+6k2)))(−2+2d(2+k+k2+2k3)−k(1+k+2k2+a(8−2k+6k2)−4(1+k2)m))
R2 = −16(1 + k)(1 + k2)(1 + 2k2)(k(15 + 56k2 + 48k4)2(−2 + 2d(2 + k + k2 +
2k3) − k(1 + k + 2k2 + a(8 − 2k + 6k2) − 4(1 + k2)m)) + 8(1 + k2)2(15 + k(−7 +
4k(10− 3k + 6k2)))(15 + k(7 + 12k(6 + k + 6k2)))µ)
R3 = −128(1 + k)(1 + k2)3(1 + 2k2)(15 + 56k2 + 48k4)2µ
R4 = 4(1 + k
2)2(3 + 4k2)2(5 + 12k2)2((−1 + 2d − 2ak)(3 + 4k2) + 2(11 + k(13 +
2k(17 + 2k(11 + 6k + 8k2))))µ
R5 = −2(1 + k2)(−75(18 + (67 + 36a)k) + 2d(1350 + k(5025 + k(23526 + k(48833 +
2k(73939 + 2k(49315 + 2k(59308 + k(56067 + 2k(53499 + 2k(20594 + k(26933 +
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6k(3407 + 2k(1133 + 12k(87 + k(17 + 24k))))))))))))))) + k2(−4a(5025 + k(13563 +
k(45290+k(89285+2k(77874+k(148521+2k(63411+k(141059+6k(7887+4k(6427+
6k(71+2k(310+9k(−1+8k)))))))))))))+6(−3921+1675m)+k(−48833+17250m+
2k(−73939 + 50372m+ 2k(−49315 + 40532m+ 2k(−59308 + 48825m+ k(−56067 +
78730m + 2k(−53499 + 46709m + 2k(−20594 + 40385m + k(−26933 + 22858m +
6k(−3407+7686m+2k(−1133+862m+12k(−87+193m+k(−17+10m+24k(−1+
2m)))))))))))))))
R6 = −4(1 + k2)(2d(675 + k(2440 + k(13043 + 2k(12399 + k(43574 + k(55249 +
2k(72620+k(71181+2k(67575+2k(29014+k(35709+2k(14965+6k(1677+4k(371+
99k+ 96k2)))))))))))))) + 225(−3 + 22µ) + k(−2440− 2a(675 + k(4880 + k(15923 +
2k(21854 + k(57487 + k(78030 + k(200661 + 2k(70435 + k(192895 + 2k(33505 +
12k(8689+2k(653+6k(412+k(19+96k))))))))))))))+5850µ+k(−13043+4880m+
57197µ+k(−24798+10640m+67418µ+k(−87148+48460m+274179µ+2k(−55249+
52056m + 166569µ + 2k(−72620 + 48809m + 177006µ + k(−71181 + 104230m +
224510µ + 2k(−67575 + 51369m + 133210µ + 2k(−29014 + 54557m + 88267µ +
k(−35709+30034m+58517µ+2k(−14965+31442m+40458µ+6k(−1677+1558m+
4k(−371 + 787m + 3k(−33 − 32k + 34m + 64km)) + 2315µ + 6k(561 + 4k(19 +
30k))µ)))))))))))))
R7 = −2(1+k2)(1350−2d(5+12k2)(270+k(29+k(1486+k(13+2k(1547+2k(−151+
2k(465 + 2k(−115 + 4k(65 + 4k(−8 + 3k(5 + k(−1 + 2k)))))))))))) + k(145 + 4a(5 +
12k2)(135 + k(29 + k(527 + k(482 + k(107 + 4k(540 + k(−477 + 4k(258 + k(−173 +
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6k(37+12(−1+k)k))))))))))+k(10670−290m+4458µ+k(413+4030m+21184µ+
2k(16651 − 3088m + 8k(−179 + 2062m + k(3483 − 2442m + 2k(−514 + 3294m +
k(2045− 3554m+ 2k(−505 + 2564m+ 12k(90− 221m+ k(−37 + 162m+ 2k(35−
82m+6k(−1+2k+4m−4km)))))))))+35821µ+2k(48071+2k(48939+8k(11039+
k(16199+k(20943+2k(11413+2k(5383+12k(345+k(235+6k(17+8k))))))))))µ)))))
R8 = 8(1 + k
2)2 + 4β(2 + (−1 + k)k)(2 + k + 3k2)(β2(2(1 + 2k2)(4 + k2(9 + k(2 +
5k)))(15+k(−7+4k(10−3k+6k2)))(15+k(7+12k(6+k+6k2)))+(2025+k2(22539+
2k(−798+k(51706+k(−3774+k(127807+2k(−2018+k(92827+8k(325+6k(1675+
k(125 + 3k(273 + 20k(1 + 3k)))))))))))))λad)− (1 +k2)(15 + 56k2 + 48k4)2(8 + 9λad+
8k2(3 + 2k2)(1 +λad)) + 2βk2(1 + 2k2)(421 + 445λad + k(2(673 + 715λad) + k(3993 +
3813λad+4k(2008+2233λad+k(3373+3142λad+4k(1132+4k(332+3k(95+k(83+
12k(3 + 2k)))) + 1255λad + k(1247 + 12k(101 + 4k(20 + 9k + 6k2)))λad)))))))
A.2 The critical discount rate which supports restricted full cooper-




















































3 − 9B4B6B7 + 27B5B27 − 576B4B5B8 + 216B26B8
Γ7 = 2 [B
3
4 − 9B4 (B6B7 + 64B5B8) + 27 (B5B27 + 8B26B8)]








2252707911306dk6 + 1916763902476k7 + 2305284805422ak7 − 3833527804952dk7 +


















3767021862912dk30− 342456532992k31 + 3767021862912ak31 + 684913065984dk31 +
183458856960k32 − 684913065984ak32 − 366917713920dk32 + 366917713920ak33 −











1933557306100k7 + 2277665843162ak7 − 3867114612200dk7 + 4532526402728k8 +


















440301256704k31 + 3082108796928ak31 + 880602513408dk31 + 110075314176k32 −
880602513408ak32−220150628352dk32+220150628352ak33+1620000m+4443300km+










2224725184566dk6 − 1899286576692k7 − 2501396876226ak7 + 3798573153384dk7 −


















171228266496k32 + 970293510144ak32 + 342456532992dk32 − 195689447424ak33 +
74520000m+204192900km+1737058500k2m+5165638920k3m+18864613800k4m+
94







B4 = 933120000 + 74520000a − 3732480000d − 149040000ad + 3732480000d2 +




85797568980a2k4 − 762328098216dk4 − 268700291280adk4 + 762328098216d2k4 +
309993033825k5+802540981620ak5+148049120520a2k5−1239972135300dk5−1605081963240adk5+
1239972135300d2k5 + 1112362592283k6 + 1309124059476ak6 + 842753865024a2k6 −
4449450369132dk6−2618248118952adk6 +4449450369132d2k6 +1899286576692k7 +
4726122060792ak7+1378275983652a2k7−7597146306768dk7−9452244121584adk7+






























































































































26315056128k14m − 29746174976ak14m + 52630112256dk14m − 6211428864k15m −
52630112256ak15m+12422857728dk15m−30065071104k16m−12422857728ak16m+
60130142208dk16m+ 5545562112k17m− 60130142208ak17m− 11091124224dk17m−
24077426688k18m + 11091124224ak18m + 48154853376dk18m + 9648267264k19m −
48154853376ak19m−19296534528dk19m−12746833920k20m+19296534528ak20m+
25493667840dk20m+ 5605687296k21m− 25493667840ak21m− 11211374592dk21m−
4013162496k22m+11211374592ak22m+8026324992dk22m+1242169344k23m−8026324992ak23m−
2484338688dk23m−573308928k24m+2484338688ak24m+1146617856dk24m−1146617856ak25m
B6 = −933120000 − 25920000a + 3732480000d + 51840000ad − 3732480000d2 −




80778926892a2k4 + 762962855256dk4 + 250537619664adk4 − 762962855256d2k4 −
311173858335k5−772531441372ak5−128152086552a2k5+1244695433340dk5+1545062882744adk5−











































1369826131968a2k33 + 1467670855680adk33 − 733835427840a2k34 + 25920000m −
51840000dm + 71081100km + 51840000akm − 142162200dkm + 492205500k2m +
142162200ak2m−984411000dk2m+1488167880k3m+984411000ak3m−2976335760dk3m+
4371444600k4m+2976335760ak4m−8742889200dk4m+13940030716k5m+8742889200ak5m−
27880061432dk5m + 24517244860k6m + 27880061432ak6m − 49034489720dk6m +


















B7 = 933120000 + 233280000a − 3732480000d − 466560000ad + 3732480000d2 +




96857724780a2k4 − 722146593240dk4 − 287740051920adk4 + 722146593240d2k4 +
280273324095k5+832502553948ak5+180250605720a2k5−1121093296380dk5−1665005107896adk5+
1121093296380d2k5 + 1031520654117k6 + 1291929405372ak6 + 942858514656a2k6 −
4126082616468dk6−2583858810744adk6 +4126082616468d2k6 +1768116005676k7 +
4844287953720ak7+1462765514364a2k7−7072464022704dk7−9688575907440adk7+








































701220519936a2k33 − 2250428645376adk33 + 782757789696a2k34 − 233280000m +
466560000dm−640572300km−466560000akm+1281144600dkm−5045773500k2m−
1281144600ak2m+10091547000dk2m−15063735240k3m−10091547000ak3m+30127470480dk3m−



































134123053392ak10 +224092751904a2k10 +648418146624dk10 +268246106784adk10−
648418146624d2k10 − 128097804672k11 − 70566237504ak11 − 68013463968a2k11 +






























478351982592d2k30 − 16307453952k31 + 210637946880ak31 + 271790899200a2k31 +
65229815808dk31−421275893760adk31−65229815808d2k31+12230590464k32−20384317440ak32−
57076088832a2k32 − 48922361856dk32 + 40768634880adk32 + 48922361856d2k32 +
24461180928ak33+24461180928a2k33−48922361856adk33−16402500m+32805000dm−






























2063041308234dk6 − 1768116005676k7 − 2781246645486ak7 + 3536232011352dk7 −




























A.3 Combinations (a, d, k) used in numerical analysis for βad
(1, 1, 0.1), (2, 1, 0.1), (3, 1, 0.1), (4, 1, 0.1), (5, 1, 0.1), (6, 1, 0.1), (7, 1, 0.1),
(8, 1, 0.1), (9, 1, 0.1), (10, 1, 0.1), (1, 2, 0.1), (1, 3, 0.1), (1, 4, 0.1), (1, 5, 0.1), (1,
6, 0.1), (1, 7, 0.1), (1, 8, 0.1), (1, 9, 0.1), (1, 10, 0.1), (2, 2, 0.1), (2, 3, 0.1), (2, 4,
0.1), (2, 5, 0.1), (2, 6, 0.1), (2, 7, 0.1), (2, 8, 0.1), (2, 9, 0.1), (2, 10, 0.1), (3, 2,
0.1), (3, 3, 0.1), (3, 4, 0.1), (3, 5, 0.1), (3, 6, 0.1), (3, 7, 0.1), (3, 8, 0.1), (3, 9, 0.1),
(3, 10, 0.1), (4, 2, 0.1), (4, 3, 0.1), (4, 4, 0.1), (4, 5, 0.1), (4, 6, 0.1), (4, 7, 0.1), (4,
8, 0.1), (4, 9, 0.1), (4, 10, 0.1), (5, 2, 0.1), (5, 3, 0.1), (5, 4, 0.1), (5, 5, 0.1), (5, 6,
0.1), (5, 7, 0.1), (5, 8, 0.1), (5, 9, 0.1), (5, 10, 0.1), (6, 2, 0.1), (6, 3, 0.1), (6, 4,
0.1), (6, 5, 0.1), (6, 6, 0.1), (6, 7, 0.1), (6, 8, 0.1), (6, 9, 0.1), (6, 10, 0.1), (7, 2,
0.1), (7, 3, 0.1), (7, 4, 0.1), (7, 5, 0.1), (7, 6, 0.1), (7, 7, 0.1), (7, 8, 0.1), (7, 9, 0.1),
(7, 10, 0.1), (8, 2, 0.1), (8, 3, 0.1), (8, 4, 0.1), (8, 5, 0.1), (8, 6, 0.1), (8, 7, 0.1),
(8, 8, 0.1), (8, 9, 0.1), (8, 10, 0.1), (9, 2, 0.1), (9, 3, 0.1), (9, 4, 0.1), (9, 5, 0.1),
(9, 6, 0.1), (9, 7, 0.1), (9, 8, 0.1), (9, 9, 0.1), (9, 10, 0.1), (10, 2, 0.1), (10, 3, 0.1),
(10, 4, 0.1), (10, 5, 0.1), (10, 6, 0.1), (10, 7, 0.1), (10, 8, 0.1), (10, 9, 0.1), (10, 10, 0.1)
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(1, 1, 0.2), (2, 1, 0.2), (3, 1, 0.2), (4, 1, 0.2), (5, 1, 0.2), (6, 1, 0.2), (7, 1, 0.2),
(8, 1, 0.2), (9, 1, 0.2), (10, 1, 0.2), (1, 2, 0.2), (1, 3, 0.2), (1, 4, 0.2), (1, 5, 0.2), (1,
6, 0.2), (1, 7, 0.2), (1, 8, 0.2), (1, 9, 0.2), (1, 10, 0.2), (2, 2, 0.2), (2, 3, 0.2), (2, 4,
0.2), (2, 5, 0.2), (2, 6, 0.2), (2, 7, 0.2), (2, 8, 0.2), (2, 9, 0.2), (2, 10, 0.2), (3, 2,
0.2), (3, 3, 0.2), (3, 4, 0.2), (3, 5, 0.2), (3, 6, 0.2), (3, 7, 0.2), (3, 8, 0.2), (3, 9, 0.2),
(3, 10, 0.2), (4, 2, 0.2), (4, 3, 0.2), (4, 4, 0.2), (4, 5, 0.2), (4, 6, 0.2), (4, 7, 0.2), (4,
8, 0.2), (4, 9, 0.2), (4, 10, 0.2), (5, 2, 0.2), (5, 3, 0.2), (5, 4, 0.2), (5, 5, 0.2), (5, 6,
0.2), (5, 7, 0.2), (5, 8, 0.2), (5, 9, 0.2), (5, 10, 0.2), (6, 2, 0.2), (6, 3, 0.2), (6, 4,
0.2), (6, 5, 0.2), (6, 6, 0.2), (6, 7, 0.2), (6, 8, 0.2), (6, 9, 0.2), (6, 10, 0.2), (7, 2,
0.2), (7, 3, 0.2), (7, 4, 0.2), (7, 5, 0.2), (7, 6, 0.2), (7, 7, 0.2), (7, 8, 0.2), (7, 9, 0.2),
(7, 10, 0.2), (8, 2, 0.2), (8, 3, 0.2), (8, 4, 0.2), (8, 5, 0.2), (8, 6, 0.2), (8, 7, 0.2),
(8, 8, 0.2), (8, 9, 0.2), (8, 10, 0.2), (9, 2, 0.2), (9, 3, 0.2), (9, 4, 0.2), (9, 5, 0.2),
(9, 6, 0.2), (9, 7, 0.2), (9, 8, 0.2), (9, 9, 0.2), (9, 10, 0.2), (10, 2, 0.2), (10, 3, 0.2),
(10, 4, 0.2), (10, 5, 0.2), (10, 6, 0.2), (10, 7, 0.2), (10, 8, 0.2), (10, 9, 0.2), (10, 10, 0.2)
(1, 1, 0.3), (2, 1, 0.3), (3, 1, 0.3), (4, 1, 0.3), (5, 1, 0.3), (6, 1, 0.3), (7, 1, 0.3),
(8, 1, 0.3), (9, 1, 0.3), (10, 1, 0.3), (1, 2, 0.3), (1, 3, 0.3), (1, 4, 0.3), (1, 5, 0.3), (1,
6, 0.3), (1, 7, 0.3), (1, 8, 0.3), (1, 9, 0.3), (1, 10, 0.3), (2, 2, 0.3), (2, 3, 0.3), (2, 4,
0.3), (2, 5, 0.3), (2, 6, 0.3), (2, 7, 0.3), (2, 8, 0.3), (2, 9, 0.3), (2, 10, 0.3), (3, 2,
0.3), (3, 3, 0.3), (3, 4, 0.3), (3, 5, 0.3), (3, 6, 0.3), (3, 7, 0.3), (3, 8, 0.3), (3, 9, 0.3),
(3, 10, 0.3), (4, 2, 0.3), (4, 3, 0.3), (4, 4, 0.3), (4, 5, 0.3), (4, 6, 0.3), (4, 7, 0.3), (4,
8, 0.3), (4, 9, 0.3), (4, 10, 0.3), (5, 2, 0.3), (5, 3, 0.3), (5, 4, 0.3), (5, 5, 0.3), (5, 6,
0.3), (5, 7, 0.3), (5, 8, 0.3), (5, 9, 0.3), (5, 10, 0.3), (6, 2, 0.3), (6, 3, 0.3), (6, 4,
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0.3), (6, 5, 0.3), (6, 6, 0.3), (6, 7, 0.3), (6, 8, 0.3), (6, 9, 0.3), (6, 10, 0.3), (7, 2,
0.3), (7, 3, 0.3), (7, 4, 0.3), (7, 5, 0.3), (7, 6, 0.3), (7, 7, 0.3), (7, 8, 0.3), (7, 9, 0.3),
(7, 10, 0.3), (8, 2, 0.3), (8, 3, 0.3), (8, 4, 0.3), (8, 5, 0.3), (8, 6, 0.3), (8, 7, 0.3),
(8, 8, 0.3), (8, 9, 0.3), (8, 10, 0.3), (9, 2, 0.3), (9, 3, 0.3), (9, 4, 0.3), (9, 5, 0.3),
(9, 6, 0.3), (9, 7, 0.3), (9, 8, 0.3), (9, 9, 0.3), (9, 10, 0.3), (10, 2, 0.3), (10, 3, 0.3),
(10, 4, 0.3), (10, 5, 0.3), (10, 6, 0.3), (10, 7, 0.3), (10, 8, 0.3), (10, 9, 0.3), (10, 10, 0.3)
(1, 1, 0.4), (2, 1, 0.4), (3, 1, 0.4), (4, 1, 0.4), (5, 1, 0.4), (6, 1, 0.4), (7, 1, 0.4),
(8, 1, 0.4), (9, 1, 0.4), (10, 1, 0.4), (1, 2, 0.4), (1, 3, 0.4), (1, 4, 0.4), (1, 5, 0.4), (1,
6, 0.4), (1, 7, 0.4), (1, 8, 0.4), (1, 9, 0.4), (1, 10, 0.4), (2, 2, 0.4), (2, 3, 0.4), (2, 4,
0.4), (2, 5, 0.4), (2, 6, 0.4), (2, 7, 0.4), (2, 8, 0.4), (2, 9, 0.4), (2, 10, 0.4), (3, 2,
0.4), (3, 3, 0.4), (3, 4, 0.4), (3, 5, 0.4), (3, 6, 0.4), (3, 7, 0.4), (3, 8, 0.4), (3, 9, 0.4),
(3, 10, 0.4), (4, 2, 0.4), (4, 3, 0.4), (4, 4, 0.4), (4, 5, 0.4), (4, 6, 0.4), (4, 7, 0.4), (4,
8, 0.4), (4, 9, 0.4), (4, 10, 0.4), (5, 2, 0.4), (5, 3, 0.4), (5, 4, 0.4), (5, 5, 0.4), (5, 6,
0.4), (5, 7, 0.4), (5, 8, 0.4), (5, 9, 0.4), (5, 10, 0.4), (6, 2, 0.4), (6, 3, 0.4), (6, 4,
0.4), (6, 5, 0.4), (6, 6, 0.4), (6, 7, 0.4), (6, 8, 0.4), (6, 9, 0.4), (6, 10, 0.4), (7, 2,
0.4), (7, 3, 0.4), (7, 4, 0.4), (7, 5, 0.4), (7, 6, 0.4), (7, 7, 0.4), (7, 8, 0.4), (7, 9, 0.4),
(7, 10, 0.4), (8, 2, 0.4), (8, 3, 0.4), (8, 4, 0.4), (8, 5, 0.4), (8, 6, 0.4), (8, 7, 0.4),
(8, 8, 0.4), (8, 9, 0.4), (8, 10, 0.4), (9, 2, 0.4), (9, 3, 0.4), (9, 4, 0.4), (9, 5, 0.4),
(9, 6, 0.4), (9, 7, 0.4), (9, 8, 0.4), (9, 9, 0.4), (9, 10, 0.4), (10, 2, 0.4), (10, 3, 0.4),
(10, 4, 0.4), (10, 5, 0.4), (10, 6, 0.4), (10, 7, 0.4), (10, 8, 0.4), (10, 9, 0.4), (10, 10, 0.4)
(1, 1, 0.5), (2, 1, 0.5), (3, 1, 0.5), (4, 1, 0.5), (5, 1, 0.5), (6, 1, 0.5), (7, 1, 0.5),
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(8, 1, 0.5), (9, 1, 0.5), (10, 1, 0.5), (1, 2, 0.5), (1, 3, 0.5), (1, 4, 0.5), (1, 5, 0.5), (1,
6, 0.5), (1, 7, 0.5), (1, 8, 0.5), (1, 9, 0.5), (1, 10, 0.5), (2, 2, 0.5), (2, 3, 0.5), (2, 4,
0.5), (2, 5, 0.5), (2, 6, 0.5), (2, 7, 0.5), (2, 8, 0.5), (2, 9, 0.5), (2, 10, 0.5), (3, 2,
0.5), (3, 3, 0.5), (3, 4, 0.5), (3, 5, 0.5), (3, 6, 0.5), (3, 7, 0.5), (3, 8, 0.5), (3, 9, 0.5),
(3, 10, 0.5), (4, 2, 0.5), (4, 3, 0.5), (4, 4, 0.5), (4, 5, 0.5), (4, 6, 0.5), (4, 7, 0.5), (4,
8, 0.5), (4, 9, 0.5), (4, 10, 0.5), (5, 2, 0.5), (5, 3, 0.5), (5, 4, 0.5), (5, 5, 0.5), (5, 6,
0.5), (5, 7, 0.5), (5, 8, 0.5), (5, 9, 0.5), (5, 10, 0.5), (6, 2, 0.5), (6, 3, 0.5), (6, 4,
0.5), (6, 5, 0.5), (6, 6, 0.5), (6, 7, 0.5), (6, 8, 0.5), (6, 9, 0.5), (6, 10, 0.5), (7, 2,
0.5), (7, 3, 0.5), (7, 4, 0.5), (7, 5, 0.5), (7, 6, 0.5), (7, 7, 0.5), (7, 8, 0.5), (7, 9, 0.5),
(7, 10, 0.5), (8, 2, 0.5), (8, 3, 0.5), (8, 4, 0.5), (8, 5, 0.5), (8, 6, 0.5), (8, 7, 0.5),
(8, 8, 0.5), (8, 9, 0.5), (8, 10, 0.5), (9, 2, 0.5), (9, 3, 0.5), (9, 4, 0.5), (9, 5, 0.5),
(9, 6, 0.5), (9, 7, 0.5), (9, 8, 0.5), (9, 9, 0.5), (9, 10, 0.5), (10, 2, 0.5), (10, 3, 0.5),
(10, 4, 0.5), (10, 5, 0.5), (10, 6, 0.5), (10, 7, 0.5), (10, 8, 0.5), (10, 9, 0.5), (10, 10, 0.5)
(1, 1, 0.6), (2, 1, 0.6), (3, 1, 0.6), (4, 1, 0.6), (5, 1, 0.6), (6, 1, 0.6), (7, 1, 0.6),
(8, 1, 0.6), (9, 1, 0.6), (10, 1, 0.6), (1, 2, 0.6), (1, 3, 0.6), (1, 4, 0.6), (1, 5, 0.6), (1,
6, 0.6), (1, 7, 0.6), (1, 8, 0.6), (1, 9, 0.6), (1, 10, 0.6), (2, 2, 0.6), (2, 3, 0.6), (2, 4,
0.6), (2, 5, 0.6), (2, 6, 0.6), (2, 7, 0.6), (2, 8, 0.6), (2, 9, 0.6), (2, 10, 0.6), (3, 2,
0.6), (3, 3, 0.6), (3, 4, 0.6), (3, 5, 0.6), (3, 6, 0.6), (3, 7, 0.6), (3, 8, 0.6), (3, 9, 0.6),
(3, 10, 0.6), (4, 2, 0.6), (4, 3, 0.6), (4, 4, 0.6), (4, 5, 0.6), (4, 6, 0.6), (4, 7, 0.6), (4,
8, 0.6), (4, 9, 0.6), (4, 10, 0.6), (5, 2, 0.6), (5, 3, 0.6), (5, 4, 0.6), (5, 5, 0.6), (5, 6,
0.6), (5, 7, 0.6), (5, 8, 0.6), (5, 9, 0.6), (5, 10, 0.6), (6, 2, 0.6), (6, 3, 0.6), (6, 4,
0.6), (6, 5, 0.6), (6, 6, 0.6), (6, 7, 0.6), (6, 8, 0.6), (6, 9, 0.6), (6, 10, 0.6), (7, 2,
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0.6), (7, 3, 0.6), (7, 4, 0.6), (7, 5, 0.6), (7, 6, 0.6), (7, 7, 0.6), (7, 8, 0.6), (7, 9, 0.6),
(7, 10, 0.6), (8, 2, 0.6), (8, 3, 0.6), (8, 4, 0.6), (8, 5, 0.6), (8, 6, 0.6), (8, 7, 0.6),
(8, 8, 0.6), (8, 9, 0.6), (8, 10, 0.6), (9, 2, 0.6), (9, 3, 0.6), (9, 4, 0.6), (9, 5, 0.6),
(9, 6, 0.6), (9, 7, 0.6), (9, 8, 0.6), (9, 9, 0.6), (9, 10, 0.6), (10, 2, 0.6), (10, 3, 0.6),
(10, 4, 0.6), (10, 5, 0.6), (10, 6, 0.6), (10, 7, 0.6), (10, 8, 0.6), (10, 9, 0.6), (10, 10, 0.6)
(1, 1, 0.7), (2, 1, 0.7), (3, 1, 0.7), (4, 1, 0.7), (5, 1, 0.7), (6, 1, 0.7), (7, 1, 0.7),
(8, 1, 0.7), (9, 1, 0.7), (10, 1, 0.7), (1, 2, 0.7), (1, 3, 0.7), (1, 4, 0.7), (1, 5, 0.7), (1,
6, 0.7), (1, 7, 0.7), (1, 8, 0.7), (1, 9, 0.7), (1, 10, 0.7), (2, 2, 0.7), (2, 3, 0.7), (2, 4,
0.7), (2, 5, 0.7), (2, 6, 0.7), (2, 7, 0.7), (2, 8, 0.7), (2, 9, 0.7), (2, 10, 0.7), (3, 2,
0.7), (3, 3, 0.7), (3, 4, 0.7), (3, 5, 0.7), (3, 6, 0.7), (3, 7, 0.7), (3, 8, 0.7), (3, 9, 0.7),
(3, 10, 0.7), (4, 2, 0.7), (4, 3, 0.7), (4, 4, 0.7), (4, 5, 0.7), (4, 6, 0.7), (4, 7, 0.7), (4,
8, 0.7), (4, 9, 0.7), (4, 10, 0.7), (5, 2, 0.7), (5, 3, 0.7), (5, 4, 0.7), (5, 5, 0.7), (5, 6,
0.7), (5, 7, 0.7), (5, 8, 0.7), (5, 9, 0.7), (5, 10, 0.7), (6, 2, 0.7), (6, 3, 0.7), (6, 4,
0.7), (6, 5, 0.7), (6, 6, 0.7), (6, 7, 0.7), (6, 8, 0.7), (6, 9, 0.7), (6, 10, 0.7), (7, 2,
0.7), (7, 3, 0.7), (7, 4, 0.7), (7, 5, 0.7), (7, 6, 0.7), (7, 7, 0.7), (7, 8, 0.7), (7, 9, 0.7),
(7, 10, 0.7), (8, 2, 0.7), (8, 3, 0.7), (8, 4, 0.7), (8, 5, 0.7), (8, 6, 0.7), (8, 7, 0.7),
(8, 8, 0.7), (8, 9, 0.7), (8, 10, 0.7), (9, 2, 0.7), (9, 3, 0.7), (9, 4, 0.7), (9, 5, 0.7),
(9, 6, 0.7), (9, 7, 0.7), (9, 8, 0.7), (9, 9, 0.7), (9, 10, 0.7), (10, 2, 0.7), (10, 3, 0.7),
(10, 4, 0.7), (10, 5, 0.7), (10, 6, 0.7), (10, 7, 0.7), (10, 8, 0.7), (10, 9, 0.7), (10, 10, 0.7)
(1, 1, 0.8), (2, 1, 0.8), (3, 1, 0.8), (4, 1, 0.8), (5, 1, 0.8), (6, 1, 0.8), (7, 1, 0.8),
(8, 1, 0.8), (9, 1, 0.8), (10, 1, 0.8), (1, 2, 0.8), (1, 3, 0.8), (1, 4, 0.8), (1, 5, 0.8), (1,
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6, 0.8), (1, 7, 0.8), (1, 8, 0.8), (1, 9, 0.8), (1, 10, 0.8), (2, 2, 0.8), (2, 3, 0.8), (2, 4,
0.8), (2, 5, 0.8), (2, 6, 0.8), (2, 7, 0.8), (2, 8, 0.8), (2, 9, 0.8), (2, 10, 0.8), (3, 2,
0.8), (3, 3, 0.8), (3, 4, 0.8), (3, 5, 0.8), (3, 6, 0.8), (3, 7, 0.8), (3, 8, 0.8), (3, 9, 0.8),
(3, 10, 0.8), (4, 2, 0.8), (4, 3, 0.8), (4, 4, 0.8), (4, 5, 0.8), (4, 6, 0.8), (4, 7, 0.8), (4,
8, 0.8), (4, 9, 0.8), (4, 10, 0.8), (5, 2, 0.8), (5, 3, 0.8), (5, 4, 0.8), (5, 5, 0.8), (5, 6,
0.8), (5, 7, 0.8), (5, 8, 0.8), (5, 9, 0.8), (5, 10, 0.8), (6, 2, 0.8), (6, 3, 0.8), (6, 4,
0.8), (6, 5, 0.8), (6, 6, 0.8), (6, 7, 0.8), (6, 8, 0.8), (6, 9, 0.8), (6, 10, 0.8), (7, 2,
0.8), (7, 3, 0.8), (7, 4, 0.8), (7, 5, 0.8), (7, 6, 0.8), (7, 7, 0.8), (7, 8, 0.8), (7, 9, 0.8),
(7, 10, 0.8), (8, 2, 0.8), (8, 3, 0.8), (8, 4, 0.8), (8, 5, 0.8), (8, 6, 0.8), (8, 7, 0.8),
(8, 8, 0.8), (8, 9, 0.8), (8, 10, 0.8), (9, 2, 0.8), (9, 3, 0.8), (9, 4, 0.8), (9, 5, 0.8),
(9, 6, 0.8), (9, 7, 0.8), (9, 8, 0.8), (9, 9, 0.8), (9, 10, 0.8), (10, 2, 0.8), (10, 3, 0.8),
(10, 4, 0.8), (10, 5, 0.8), (10, 6, 0.8), (10, 7, 0.8), (10, 8, 0.8), (10, 9, 0.8), (10, 10, 0.8)
(1, 1, 0.9), (2, 1, 0.9), (3, 1, 0.9), (4, 1, 0.9), (5, 1, 0.9), (6, 1, 0.9), (7, 1, 0.9),
(8, 1, 0.9), (9, 1, 0.9), (10, 1, 0.9), (1, 2, 0.9), (1, 3, 0.9), (1, 4, 0.9), (1, 5, 0.9), (1,
6, 0.9), (1, 7, 0.9), (1, 8, 0.9), (1, 9, 0.9), (1, 10, 0.9), (2, 2, 0.9), (2, 3, 0.9), (2, 4,
0.9), (2, 5, 0.9), (2, 6, 0.9), (2, 7, 0.9), (2, 8, 0.9), (2, 9, 0.9), (2, 10, 0.9), (3, 2, 0.9),
(3, 3, 0.9), (3, 4, 0.9), (3, 5, 0.9), (3, 6, 0.9), (3, 7, 0.9), (3, 8, 0.9), (3, 9, 0.9), (3,
10, 0.9), (4, 2, 0.9), (4, 3, 0.9), (4, 4, 0.9), (4, 5, 0.9), (4, 6, 0.9), (4, 7, 0.9), (4, 8,
0.9), (4, 9, 0.9), (4, 10, 0.9), (5, 2, 0.9), (5, 3, 0.9), (5, 4, 0.9), (5, 5, 0.9), (5, 6, 0.9),
(5, 7, 0.9), (5, 8, 0.9), (5, 9, 0.9), (5, 10, 0.9), (6, 2, 0.9), (6, 3, 0.9), (6, 4, 0.9), (6,
5, 0.9), (6, 6, 0.9), (6, 7, 0.9), (6, 8, 0.9), (6, 9, 0.9), (6, 10, 0.9), (7, 2, 0.9), (7, 3,
0.9), (7, 4, 0.9), (7, 5, 0.9), (7, 6, 0.9), (7, 7, 0.9), (7, 8, 0.9), (7, 9, 0.9), (7, 10, 0.9),
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(8, 2, 0.9), (8, 3, 0.9), (8, 4, 0.9), (8, 5, 0.9), (8, 6, 0.9), (8, 7, 0.9), (8, 8, 0.9), (8, 9,
0.9), (8, 10, 0.9), (9, 2, 0.9), (9, 3, 0.9), (9, 4, 0.9), (9, 5, 0.9), (9, 6, 0.9), (9, 7, 0.9),
(9, 8, 0.9), (9, 9, 0.9), (9, 10, 0.9), (10, 2, 0.9), (10, 3, 0.9), (10, 4, 0.9), (10, 5, 0.9),
(10, 6, 0.9), (10, 7, 0.9), (10, 8, 0.9), (10, 9, 0.9), (10, 10, 0.9)
• combination (5, 2, 0.3), (5, 4, 0.7), (5, 5, 0.9) provide that the critical discount
rate under antidumping duty is higher than the free trade one.
• combination (2, 1, 0.4), (1, 1, 0.5), (3, 2, 0.5), (5, 3, 0.5), (7, 4, 0.5), (9, 5,




B.1 The shrimp farm area in Thailand
The data is from the Agriculture statistic yearbook by the office of Agricultural
Economic, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Thailand
1. Bangkok


























B.2 Supply rotation with rainfall
In this section, we discuss how rainfall rotate fresh shrimp supply. To do so,
we consider the fresh shrimp production function to have mixed fashion between
Loentief and Cobb-Douglas. More specifically, we assume the production function
to be
f(B,R,L,D) = min{vB,RLγKα} (B.1)
where B, R, L, K are baby shrimp, rainfall, labor, and capital ( or diesel in this
case). v is conversion ration from baby shrimp to fresh shrimp. The production
cost of fresh shrimp is
C = wBvB + wLL+ wDD (B.2)
where wB, wL, and wD are price of baby shrimp, wage, and price of diesel.
The optimal input demand can be obtained from cost minimization
min
B,L,D
wBvB + wLL+ wDD (B.3)
subject to
y = f(B,R,L,D). (B.4)
Thus, we can obtain the optimal input demand

































Substituting the optimal input demand into equation B.2, we obtain the op-
timal production cost of fresh shrimp
C(y,R, v, wB, wL, wk) = wBvB(v, y, wB) +wLL(y,R,wL, wD) +wDD(y,R,wL, wD).
(B.8)
The marginal cost of fresh shrimp production is
c(y,R, v, wB, wL, wk) =













From marginal cost equation B.9, we can see that rainfall is a part of slope of the
marginal cost, so changing in rainfall result in a change of the slope of marginal
cost, i.e. fresh shrimp supply rotation. On the other hand, changing in other input
price will result in a shift in fresh shrimp supply.
122
B.3 Month of shrimp culture
Table B.1: Month of shrimp culture by size










Table B.2: Average month of shrimp culture by year
Size 1996-2003 2004-2005 2006-2008
30 6 6 5
40 5 4 4
50 5 4 4
60 4 4 4
70 4 3 3
80 3 3 3
90 3 3 3
100 3 3 3
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